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Abstract 
This paper exploits a new and exciting source of data on public employment 
recruitment in order to analyse the evolution of Tibetan representation and 
preferential hiring practices in public employment in all Tibetan areas from 
2007 to 2015. Despite the limitations of these data, they provide a far more 
substantiated understanding of recent conditions than currently exists in the 
literature, even in the Chinese literature. Several major insights can be made 
from scrutinizing these data. First, following the retrenchment in public 
employment in the early 2000s and then the ending of the job placement 
system (Ch. fenpei), there was a strong increase in public employment 
recruitment from 2011 onwards. Second, Tibetan representation within the 
recruitment did not collapse, although it lagged significantly; within our sample 
of outcome documents, Tibetans were underrepresented in the recruitments 
across all Tibetan areas from 2007 to 2015, without any apparent regional or 
temporal patterns, at an average of 83 percent of what would be parity with 
their population share. More information is also needed on the ethnic 
composition of people exiting from public employment in order to have a 
more holistic evaluation of the evolution of Tibetan representation. 
Nonetheless, despite underrepresentation, new recruitment from 2011 onwards 
employed a much larger share of the university-aged population than during 
the late fenpei period, thereby reasserting the role of the state as predominant 
employment provider for educated Tibetan millennials. 
Practices of preferentiality appear to significantly bolster representation, 
although they exhibited distinct temporal and regional variations. Language or 
Tibetan-medium degree type requirements were generally on the decline 
(especially in the TAR and Gannan, where their use became very marginal), 
with the exception of the Amdo region in Qinghai. Conversely, the use of 
residency requirements across all Tibetan regions has emerged as a significant 
form of practicing preferentiality in public employment, especially in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR), where all public sector recruitments specify local 
‘origin’ (Ch. shengyuan) since at least 2007. The TAR also reintroduced 
employment guarantees for all local university graduates in 2011, in what we 
call the innovation of a neo-fenpei system. The decline in the use of linguistic 
requirements suggests the continuation and entrenchment of assimilationist 
trends in education and employment policies, and a lack of priority for Tibetan 
medium education more generally (with the exception of the Amdo region in 
Qinghai). However, the stable and in some cases increasing use of residency 
requirements, especially in civil service positions suggests a trend of local level 
protectionism in public employment, probably led by local governments. 
Keywords 
Tibet; China; public employment recruitment and reforms; ethnic 
representation; preferentiality and positive discrimination; language   
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The evolution of Tibetan representation and preferentiality in 
public employment during the Post-f enpe i  period in China: 
insights from new data sources 
 
Graduate employment is a heated politicized issue in the Tibetan areas of 
China. It is also a heated issue elsewhere in China, although it carries extra 
weight in the Tibetan areas given the severe disadvantages that Tibetans face in 
competing for employment in Tibetan towns and cities, where Han Chinese 
migrants to Tibetan areas are mostly concentrated. In particular, the types of 
urban employment that are deemed appropriate for university graduates tend 
to be dominated by Han Chinese, or else biased towards those who possess 
stronger Chinese language skills (and related cultural aptitudes). Hence, even 
Tibetans with tertiary levels of education face considerable disadvantages in the 
jobs that they target given their linguistic disadvantages in job competitions, 
and these linguistic biases in turn undermine efforts of linguistic preservation 
in higher education. The fact that tertiary graduates are also among the most 
political active of their society does not assuage the sensitivity of these issues in 
Tibetan areas. 
Pressure has been mounting since the early 2000s in particular because of 
two contradictory dynamics: rising schooling attainments among Tibetans, 
especially in tertiary education, in contrast to the phasing out of the job 
assignment system (fenpei) from the late 1990s onwards. With regard to the 
former, rising schooling attainments have shifted the employment aspirations 
of an increasing share of young Tibetans away from fields and pastures, and 
towards the booming towns and cities that have been integral to development 
strategies in these regions, even more so than in other parts of China given the 
relative paucity of off-farm rural employment opportunities, as analysed by 
Fischer (2005, 2011, 2014). Moreover, the rapid increase in schooling 
attainments has been facilitated outside the TAR by an even more rapid 
expansion of Tibetan-medium education in both breadth and depth, as 
analysed in detail by Zenz (2013). This has accentuated demands for 
preferential employment practices because, in the absence of preferentiality, 
the non-Tibetan employers who dominate the urban economies of Tibet do 
not value Tibetan-medium education.  
A further unique dilemma of the urban employment system in Tibetan 
areas is the extremely limited supply of formal and secure non-state (or private 
corporate) employment that would correspond to the levels of schooling and 
the associated employment expectations of tertiary graduates. This lack of 
gradation in local urban employment results in an all-or-nothing scenario 
facing Tibetan graduates, given that the only significant alternative to public 
employment is the option of insecure, lower status and lower wage forms of 
private enterprise employment or self-employment. Moreover, minorities such 
as Tibetans are more prone to face discrimination in the private than in the 
public sector, for instances as aptly shown in an analysis of callback rates for 
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online job postings by Maurer-Fazio (2012).1 The employment expectations of 
tertiary graduates are therefore heavily focused on the state sector (and public 
employment more specifically, rather than state-owned enterprise 
employment), much more so than in China’s Han-dominated regions. Indeed, 
Démurger (2015:29) similarly finds a much higher dependence on state-owned 
unit employment among minorities with similar characteristics to Tibetans 
(such as Khazaks) than the Han, based on national urban employment data 
(also cf. Wu and Song, 2013). The silver lining is that it is much easier to 
enforce preferentiality within the public sector than in the private corporate 
sector, where appeals for efficiency tend to trump demands for equity. Indeed, 
both Fischer (2005; 2009; 2014) and Zenz (2013) have identified the nexus 
between tertiary schooling and public employment as crucial in supporting or 
undermining Tibetan education and the development of Tibetan-medium 
schooling in particular. 
With regard to the erstwhile fenpei or job assignment system, this legacy 
from the collective and early reform eras effectively served as an implicit 
preferential employment policy in minority areas given that it guaranteed 
employment to secondary vocational and university graduates. It thereby 
allowed for several generations of a small but growing cohort of university 
educated Tibetans to embed themselves within various state institutions. As 
discussed by Zenz (2013), it also supported Tibetan-medium schooling given 
that employment was guaranteed to graduates regardless of the language 
medium or the degree type of their studies. Although the preferentiality was 
implicit, the fenpei system was arguably the most important form of positive 
discrimination practiced in Tibetan areas given that it actually guaranteed 
outcomes in coveted public employment.  
However, this system was phased out precisely at a time when the rapid 
urbanization of an increasingly schooled Tibetan labour force was taking off, 
thereby exacerbating the disadvantages and insecurities perceived and 
experienced by Tibetans within these parallel transitions. The end of fenpei was 
part of the broader state-sector employment reforms that started in eastern 
China earlier in the 1990s and reached the Tibetan areas from the late 1990s 
onwards. The precise timing depends on the province or even the locality or 
sector within a province. In most regions of Qinghai province, fenpei was 
phased out around 2001-02, although some prefectures abolished it in the late 
1990s (Zenz, 2013: 132; also see Fischer, 2005, 2009, 2014). In Gansu, it 
continued to some extent until the mid-2000s. The reforms started to be 
implemented in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2006, with full 
implementation applied to all graduates from 2007 onwards, which was the 
latest of all provinces.2 The end of fenpei was compounded by the more general 
                                                
1 She found that applicants with Tibetan names were less than half as likely to receive a 
callback than those with Han names, but that state firms were much more likely to render 
equal treatment to applicants with minority names than private firms. 
2 For instance, see 西藏成最后一个告别大学毕业生计划分配的省份 (xizang cheng 
zuihou yige gaobie daxuesheng biyesheng jihua fenpei de shengfen, tr. ‘The TAR accomplishes 
its final farewell to the provincial graduate student’s job assignment system’, Xinhua, Nov 27, 
2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2006-11/27/content_5394400.htm (last 
accessed on 5 January 2016).  
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retrenchment and restructuring of state-sector employment in 1990s and 2000s 
(which again started earlier and went deeper in eastern China than in the 
Tibetan areas). As a result, one of the most substantive pillars of positive 
discrimination in Tibetan areas was removed precisely at a time when demands 
for preferentiality were increasing.  
Nevertheless, preferential employment practices outlived the job 
assignment system through a variety of innovations. Indeed, some older 
practices survived the public employment reforms such as the preferential 
points system in job competitions, whereby minorities are given extra points 
on their exams for job competitions, or else lower point thresholds for 
qualifying in these exams. One innovation has been the practice of specifying 
language or even Tibetan-medium degree qualifications in public employment 
recruitments, which is technically permitted under the minority nationality laws 
of China and effectively offers a strong competitive advantage to Tibetans 
competing for such positions. The other innovation is the specification of local 
residency requirements in job recruitments, although this does not necessarily 
preclude non-Tibetans residing in Tibetan areas. The extent to which Tibetans 
are hired in Tibetan areas is usually greater than the number of posts with these 
specifications, insofar as Tibetans might make up the bulk of more general 
hiring as well. This is particularly the case in remote areas that are populated by 
large Tibetan majorities and where local preferentiality might also be practiced 
informally, such as through clientelism or nepotism, as analysed by Zenz (2013: 
chapter five). Institutional or structural inertia also tends to benefit locals in job 
recruitments, such as the remoteness of many Tibetan areas, which makes 
them undesirable for non-local applicants. Nonetheless, at the formal level, 
language, degree-type, or residency specifications are currently the most 
decisive means of practicing preferentiality in public employment. Language or 
degree-type specifications also have the additional feedback effect of 
supporting the development of Tibetan-medium education.  
The problem is that we have had very little if any rigorous or systematic 
information on the extent of these post-fenpei practices or outcomes in Tibetan 
areas. In effect, the phasing out of the fenpei led to a period of ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the public employment systems in Tibetan areas. A strong 
assimilationist policy orientation appeared to be ascendant, which was buffered 
by a growing critique of minority nationality policy in China by the likes of Ma 
(2007) and others. 3 As argued by Fischer (2009, 2012, 2014), this perception 
contributed to the political resentment that fuelled widespread protests 
throughout Tibetan areas inside and outside the TAR in 2008 and after. 
However, beyond this perception and the sporadic insights that substantiate it, 
we have had very little evidence with which to evaluate the actual situation. 
Indeed, the scholarship on minority nationality policy (e.g. see Leibold, 2013) 
has been mostly focused at the level of national politics and legality, whereas 
actual practices of preferentiality have evolved from the ground up with a 
strong degree of local specificity (albeit, obviously with a degree of central-level 
approbation, particularly concerning any policy development in the TAR).  
                                                
3 See the survey of these debates in China by Leibold (2013).  
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The main impediment is the lack of public employment data disaggregated 
according to nationality (minzu) status, which have been non-existent in 
publically available statistical sources since the early 2000s. The TAR did 
provide staff and worker data disaggregated by Tibetans and non-Tibetans up 
until 2003, up to the 2004 Tibet Statistical Yearbook (TSY 2004), although 
similar disaggregations are not publically available for other provinces 
containing Tibetan areas.4 According to these data, Fischer (2005: 115) 
observed a reduction of Tibetans in state-sector staff and worker employment 
in the TAR in 2002 and 2003, in both number and share. In particular, the 
Tibetan share of cadre employment fell sharply to just below 50 percent in 
2003, which was the lowest level it had reached since 1980. Since that time, 
only anecdotal evidence or else indirect statistical extrapolations exist to 
suggest that the trends might have continued in the TAR through the 2000s, 
and possibly in other Tibetan areas as well (for some extrapolations, see 
Fischer, 2014: 234-35).  
On the other hand, more recent policy developments appear to have 
changed the situation dramatically since the 2008 protests. Most notable is the 
major policy change for the TAR launched at the 8th Party Congress in 
November 2011, when the new TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo 
announced the aim of achieving ‘full employment’ (Ch. quan jiuye) for all 
tertiary graduates who are TAR residents.5 This new policy thereby effectively 
reintroduced a form of job guarantee scheme, or what might be called a neo-
fenpei system. The policy was still in force as of 2015, and the TAR government 
claimed to have achieved four consecutive years of full employment for TAR 
resident tertiary graduates (from 2011 to 2014).6 To the best of our knowledge, 
such momentous policy developments have not been registered at all in the 
social science scholarship on Tibet, in particular outside of China.   
As a means to overcome some of these data limitations, this paper exploits 
a new and exciting data source on public employment recruitment. The data 
first became available online in 2007 for the TAR, and for the civil service of 
Qinghai and of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in Sichuan, and 
they have become widely available throughout Tibetan areas since 2010, based 
on an increasingly comprehensive publication of recruitment advertisements by 
government institutions. In particular, the data contain specifications such as 
minority language capabilities, and degree and/or residency requirements. The 
actual recruitment outcomes (or else intermediate shortlists of candidates) have 
also been published, although these data are often less comprehensive and less 
                                                
4 As analyzed in Fischer (2013), the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region yearbooks also 
provided a disaggregation of staff and worker employment by minority (Uyghurs, Kazaks and 
Hui) and non-minority (Han) minzu status up until XSY (2003), for data up to 2002.  
5 See Xiao Bang, Duan Min and Gao Wangjie. 2012. 西藏籍大学生“全就业”透视：公
职岗位占八成 (xizangji daxuesheng ‘quanjiuye’ toushi: gongzhi gangwei zhan bacheng, tr. 
TAR resident graduates ‘full employment’ examined: public jobs stand at 80 percent), Zhongguo 
gongchandang xinwenwang (News Network of the Chinese Communist Party), Dec 26, 
http://renshi.people.com.cn/n/2012/1226/c139617-20023201.html 
6 See 西藏籍应届高校毕业生连续4年全就业(xizangji yingjie gaoxiao biyesheng lianxu 4 
nian quanjiuye, tr. This year’s TAR resident higher education graduates with full employment 
for the fourth consecutive year), People’s Network, March 7, 2015, 
http://society.people.com.cn/n/2015/0307/c136657-26654444.html 
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consistently disseminated, even though some of the outcome documents are 
highly detailed. This practice of publishing recruitment advertisements and 
outcomes appears to be part of a wider effort to combat corruption in public 
recruitment processes by providing transparency given that such corruption 
has been an important source of minority (and Han) discontent.7   
These data offer a unique opportunity to explore the evolution of formal 
practices of preferentiality in recruitment and, in some cases, to assess the 
extent of ethnic representation in the outcomes of these job recruitments in 
terms of the minzu identity of those hired (for both preferential and non-
preferential jobs). Obviously, as recruitment data, these only offer indications 
of inflow rather than stock or outflow variables, that is, the extent to which 
additions to employment have been preferential or have resulted in Tibetan 
employment, rather than the extent of ethnic representation in existing 
employment. Even though the bulk of existing public employees would have 
been hired in the earlier job assignment system era and hence it might be 
plausible to assume a substantial share of Tibetan employment in Tibetan 
areas, this situation cannot be presumed to have persisted into the mid-2000s 
given the substantial retrenchment and restructuring of state-sector 
employment in the early 2000s, as mentioned above in the case of the TAR. A 
full appraisal of net changes in employment would also require some 
information on attrition, that is, retirements, lay-offs, or transfers (indeed, a 
substantial share of new state-sector employment in the TAR appears to be 
filled by channels other than these local recruitments). Nonetheless, the new 
data provide valuable insights that can be triangulated with more macro 
sources of employment data to provide a far more substantiated understanding 
of current conditions and practices than currently exists in the literature, even 
in the Chinese literature.  
Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing these data. Most 
importantly, despite almost a decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in the public 
employment systems of the Tibetan areas due to retrenchment and the ending 
of fenpei, Tibetan representation within public recruitment did not collapse, 
although it lagged significantly, in tandem with strong increases in overall 
public employment from 2011 onwards. Within our sample of outcome 
documents that indicate ethnicity, Tibetans were underrepresented across all 
Tibetan areas from 2007 to 2015, without much apparent regional or temporal 
variation, at an average of 83 percent of what would be parity with their 
population share. This underrepresentation is significant enough to result in a 
chronic erosion of representation overtime and does not address historical 
underrepresentation, although more information is also needed on the ethnic 
composition of people exiting from public employment, such as through 
retirements or transfers to other provinces, in order to have a more holistic 
evaluation of the evolution of Tibetan representation. For instance, transfers 
out of the province are likely to be disproportionately non-Tibetan and hence 
compensating for the underrepresentation in recruitments. Moreover, 
                                                
7 This insight has been suggested through discussions with various Tibetan and Chinese 
scholars and is implied by the level of detail offered by some of the documents. The problem 
of corruption, e.g. bribery, in public recruitment is discussed in Zenz (2013, chapter 5). Also 
see Hillman (2014).  
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following the surge in public employment, particularly in the TAR, new 
recruitment has employed a much larger share of the university-aged 
population than during the late job assignment period, thereby reasserting the 
role of the state as predominant employment provider for educated Tibetan 
millennials, after a period in which this role appeared to be waning under the 
force of retrenchment and marketising reforms.  
While practices of preferentiality appear to significantly bolster this 
representation, they exhibit distinct temporal and regional variations. 
According to the recruitment data we have been able to analyse, language or 
Tibetan-medium degree type requirements in the TAR and in Gannan TAP in 
Gansu became very marginal, reflecting a very specialised niche role in the use 
of such specifications. The same requirements played a large role in Ganzi 
TAP in Sichuan, although this role diminished up to 2015, whereas their use in 
the Amdo region of Qinghai increased over this period. The trends in Yushu 
have been unclear (Dechen/Deqin TAP in Yunnan was not analysed).8 
Overall, these linguistic specifications appear to have been largely in bilingual 
rather than Tibetan-medium degree requirements, and also concentrated in 
teaching positions, although this depends on the region and year. In contrast, 
the use of residency requirements across all Tibetan regions has emerged as the 
dominant form of practicing preferentiality or protecting jobs for locals in 
public employment. In the TAR, the transition from a fenpei system to a system 
of local residency requirements appears to have been seamless, given that all 
public sector recruitments from 2007 onwards specify local ‘origin’ (Ch. 
shengyuan), as a form of residency. The use of local residency requirements 
outside the TAR also became more prominent in Yushu from 2009 onwards 
and then in all other regions from about 2012-13 onwards.  
The decline in the use of language and Tibetan-medium degree 
requirements suggests the continuation and entrenchment of assimilationist 
trends in education and employment policies, and a lack of priority for Tibetan 
medium education more generally (with the exception of the Amdo region in 
Qinghai). However, the increasing use of residency requirements, particularly 
in the civil service, suggests a trend of local level protectionism in public 
employment, probably led by local governments. This new development holds 
both promise as well as complications, the latter in relation to the labour 
mobility of university educated Tibetans across the Tibetan areas in China at a 
time when there has been a glut of qualified Tibetan candidates, as a result of 
surging university intakes in the 2000s.  
These insights and their implications are discussed in the following five 
sections. The first provides an overview of the urban employment situation in 
the Tibetan areas, with a particular focus on the TAR where data are most 
complete, supplemented by data from other Tibetan areas where available, in 
order to illustrate the strong degree of similarity across regions despite 
different institutional/governance contexts. Second, the data sources, 
employment categories, and recruitment processes are presented, along with 
                                                
8 Dechen/Deqin TAR was excluded given the poor quality of the published public recruitment 
data. In any case, the small population weight of this prefecture would have little effect on the 
broader results presented in this paper.  
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the methods used in their analysis. Third, the recruitment outcomes are 
discussed, in terms of what can be gleaned from the patchy outcome data. The 
more comprehensive recruitment advertisement data are then analysed in two 
sections as a means to gain greater insight in the evolving policies and practices 
of preferential hiring in public employment, the first in terms of Tibetan-
medium specifications and the second in terms of residency requirements, with 
further specifications on the policy developments in the TAR. The conclusion 
explores some of the implications of these findings. 
1 Overview of the urban employment situation in the 
Tibetan areas 
The urban employment system in Tibetan areas up until the 1990s was 
dominated by state-owned units, whether in the public sector (e.g. ‘government 
work units’) or in state-owned enterprises (for the sake of simplicity, the 
combination can be referred to as ‘state-sector employment’). In the TAR, 
Tibetans accounted for just over 71 percent of such state-sector ‘staff and 
worker’ employment up until 2000, although the share fell to just under 65 
percent in 2003, and the Tibetan share of cadre employment more specifically 
fell from almost 72 percent in 2000 to just under 50 percent in 2003 (Fischer 
2005: 115). The declining share corresponded to an overall reduction in the 
number state-sector staff and workers, which was disproportionately bourn by 
Tibetans whereas the number of non-Tibetan staff and workers increased. 
Given that regular public employees generally cannot be laid off, the 
reductions probably occurred in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), although a 
freeze on hiring combined with early retirements in public employment could 
have equally contributed to the reduction. 
From the late 1990s there was also a gradually increasing number and 
share of registered employment in private enterprises and self-employment. 
The occupants of such employment would have included Tibetan migrants 
from local rural areas, migrants from other parts of China (both Tibetan and 
non-Tibetan), or by Tibetan urban residents not working in (or laid-off from) 
the state-sector. The heavily subsidized rapid growth of Tibetan towns and 
cities in the 2000s fuelled a brisk increase of these more informal types of 
private employment, stimulating both local Tibetan and interprovincial 
migration. Because state-sector employment remained stagnant until the mid-
2000s due to retrenchment, even despite the fact that the state-sector 
dominated economic growth in terms of economic value-added, its share of 
overall urban employment fell sharply and the share of private enterprise and 
self-employment increased sharply, to more than half of total urban 
employment by 2007.  
Despite this rapid transformation since the late 1990s, a persisting feature 
of urban employment in Tibetan areas has been the extremely limited supply of 
non-state formal employment, at least up to 2012. This refers to employment 
that offers wages, security, benefits and status en par with state-sector 
employment. As a result, the state-sector was the almost exclusive source of 
jobs appropriate for university graduates in these regions up until 2012. As 
discussed further below, there appears to be a new development in the TAR 
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from 2013 onwards of sharp increases in non-state formal employment, albeit 
this would nonetheless be heavily subsidised by the state given the on-going 
extremely heavy subsidisation of the TAR economy (e.g. see Fischer 2015). 
The persistence of the situation up to 2012 appears to have been unique in 
comparison to all other regions and provinces in China (although it might be 
similar to other remote sub-regions of other western provinces, i.e. it might be 
as much a result of peripherality as it is an outcome of policy or the result of 
‘underdevelopment’). 
1.1 Clarifying urban employment categories in China 
To clarify these classifications, urban employment in China is officially defined, 
registered and reported according to three broad ownership categories: urban 
units, private enterprises, and self-employment. In addition, the sum of these 
three does not amount to total urban employment (except in the TAR).9 The 
residual can be considered as an estimate of purely informal employment, that 
is, employment that is not registered under any category (and hence the figures 
on total urban employment are probably estimates). 
Based on institutional definitions in China, ‘urban unit’ employment 
effectively amounts to a formalized and relatively privileged sub-category of 
urban employment, with higher wages and greater job security than in other 
forms of urban employment, and endowed with social security and other 
benefits. ‘Units’ in this sense are akin to corporate entities, whether public or 
private. They include state, collective/cooperative and non-state (or ‘private’) 
units of ownership. State-owned units can be conceptually divided between 
public employment (in government work units) and employment in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Non-state, non-collective units include units of 
joint ownership, limited liability and shareholding corporations, foreign-funded 
units, and units with funding from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.10 For 
example, corporations such as China Telecom, Sinopec, most banks in China, 
and many of the mining companies operating in Tibetan areas are state owned 
enterprises (although many of them might also issue shares). Companies such 
as Alibaba would most likely be registered as share holding corporations 
(particularly since it floated on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014), 
whereas Foxconn would be registered as a unit with funding from Taiwan. The 
Tibet Lhasa Brewery Company was once a state owned enterprise, although it 
started issuing its first public shares in 1997 and hence might have been re-
registered as a share holding corporation from that time onwards, despite 
continued state ownership. It would have then been registered as either a joint 
venture or a foreign-funded unit when Carlsberg acquired a major shareholding 
in the company in 2004, although its shares continue to be traded (indeed, this 
example demonstrates the difficulties of attributing exclusive ownership status 
within these categories).  
                                                
9 This either begs questions of the accuracy of the TAR total employment data or else reflects 
the strict registration of the workforce in the police state context of the TAR. 
10 This breakdown of urban units can be found in the China Statistical Yearbooks. See Fischer 
(2014: chapter 5) for further details.  
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In terms of structure, state-owned units (government work units and 
SOEs) accounted for 18.4 percent of total estimated urban employment in 
China in 2012 (including registered and unregistered/informal employment). 
Collective/cooperative units have become a very marginal category in the 
contemporary urban setting in China, at about 2 percent of total urban 
employment in China in 2012 (down from 26 percent in 1985). The largest 
employers in the ‘private’ corporate urban units in China have become limited 
liability corporations, which accounted for 10.2 percent of total estimated 
urban employment in 2012, while share-holding corporations and foreign 
funded units each accounted for 3.4 percent. In comparison, private 
enterprises accounted for 20.4 percent of total estimated urban employment in 
China in 2012, and self-employment accounted for 15.2 percent.   
Previously, up to 2008 in the national yearbooks, urban unit employees 
were also referred to as ‘staff and workers’, while the ‘urban unit’ category was 
introduced from 2006 onward.11 Both terms refer to persons working 
(permanently or on contract) in these urban units and do not include those 
working in (formally registered) urban private enterprises or in urban self-
employment.12 They would refer to both blue and white-collar employees 
working in these units. The employment reported in urban units is also not 
based on household residency (at least, not recently – this might have been the 
case up to the 1990s) and, hence, it would include temporary migrants, such as 
those working in the state-sector of the TAR and other Tibetan areas.13 Due to 
the associated wages, status, security and benefits, university graduates 
generally target urban unit white collar ‘staff’ jobs in particular, whether in the 
public or private sector. 
In contrast to ‘urban unit’ employment, ‘private enterprise’ employment is 
a semi-formal employment category, in the sense that the jobs generally lack 
social security and other benefits, and are at much lower wages on average than 
in the corporate urban units (state or non-state).14 Similar considerations apply 
                                                
11 The actual difference between the two measures of employment was negligible in CSY 
(2007), when the two data series overlapped. Similarly, the difference of average wages in the 
two categories was also negligible, although those of employed persons in urban units was 
slightly lower than those of staff and workers in these years, suggesting a wider inclusion of 
some workers employed in formal urban units not previously categorized as staff and workers 
and who are probably at the lower end of the wage scale within the respective urban units 
(such as part-time and/or contract workers). The difference is greater in the TAR than in the 
other provinces, suggesting a wider wage dispersion than elsewhere in China.  
12 See the explanatory notes in CSY (2007). More generally, ‘staff and workers’ did not include 
persons employed in township or private enterprises, urban self-employed persons, retirees, re-
employed retirees, teachers in the schools run by local people, foreigners, persons from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other persons not included by ‘relevant regulations’ (CSY 2005, 
Explanatory notes for Chapter Five). 
13 The same would apply in the case of registered employment in private enterprises, whereas 
the registered urban self-employed are expected to hold urban residency certificates or to have 
resided in urban areas for a long time. 
14 Average wage data generally refer to the ‘urban units’. The average wages of employed 
persons in (registered) urban private enterprises started to be reported for the first time in CSY 
(2010, table 4-17) for data starting in 2009, although these data were not reported for the TAR. 
According to these data in 2012 (CSY 2013 tables 4-11 and 4-16), average wages in private 
enterprises (28,752 yuan) were about 60 percent of those in urban units (46,769 yuan). No 
official wage data have been available for the poorer informalized categories of urban 
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for self-employment. In this sense, ‘private enterprise’ is not equivalent to what 
might be more generally called the ‘private sector’, in that it does not include 
private ‘urban units’. Hence, it does not include professional employment in 
the ‘private’ corporate sector, which is registered in the distinct categories of 
non-state ‘urban unit’ employment, as explained above.15 Examples of private 
enterprises include restaurants, catering, small retail shops, internet cafes, 
tourism operators, various types of family businesses, or the many small to 
medium-sized companies in prefectural or provincial capitals that offer 
different kinds of lower- to medium-skilled services. 
1.2 Urban employment polarisation in Tibet 
This clarification is crucial to understand the unique urban employment 
context of the Tibetan areas, as referred to above. In comparison to most 
other parts of China, the urban employment structure in the TAR and other 
Tibetan areas is polarized between a strong component of well-remunerated 
and secure state-owned unit employment on one hand, and private enterprise 
employment and self-employment on the other, the latter offering considerably 
less employment security and, on average, lower pay. The absence of any 
significant amount of private corporate employment with similar benefits as 
state sector jobs creates a gap between these two types of employment, with 
little to bridge them. 
The TAR provides a good example of this polarization compared to other 
parts of China. Based on the 2010 employment data (drawing from Fischer 
2014: 226), the TAR had 531,000 people registered as employed in urban areas. 
As shown in table 1, almost 42 percent worked in urban units, while 58 percent 
worked in either private enterprises or were self-employed. As noted above, 
there was no residual in the TAR, implying that either all employed were 
registered or else that purely informal employees were not estimated in these 
data. Of the 42 percent registered with urban units, nearly all (93 percent) 
worked in state sector units, whereas only 7 percent worked in collective or 
private non-state urban units (or, respectively, 39 percent and 3 percent of total 
registered urban employment). 
In contrast, 55 percent of the registered urban employment in Qinghai 
was in urban units, and 75 percent of this urban unit employment was in the 
state sector, leaving a much greater proportion – 25 percent – working in non-
state units (or about 15 percent of total registered employment). In Gansu, 61 
percent of registered urban employment was in units and, of this, 25 percent 
was also in non-state units. These proportions need to be qualified by the fact 
that both Qinghai and Gansu had a significant proportion of total estimated 
urban employment that appears to have been informal (about one quarter in 
both cases), although the non-state unit shares nonetheless reveal a much 
wider range of graduate employment options than in the TAR. Similarly, 55 
                                                                                                                        
employment in China, such as the self-employed or construction workers not working under 
contract, or even for registered private units in the TAR despite the predominance of private 
enterprise and self-employment in the TAR. Note that these wages are averages and these 
categories of employment are heterogeneous, containing a minority of high earners.  
15 For further detail, see Fischer (2014, chapter five). 
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percent of registered urban employment in Sichuan was in urban units and 
about 40 percent of this was in non-state units (or 22 percent of total 
registered employment). This was close to the China average, where urban 
units also accounted for 55 percent total registered urban employment (albeit 
almost one third of total estimated urban employment appears to have been 
informal, in the sense of not being included in these registered employment 
data), and non-state units accounted for 50 percent of this urban unit 
employment (or about 27.5 percent of total registered urban employment). At 
this provincial level of comparison, it is only the TAR that stood out with an 
extremely limited range of more formalised employment options outside of the 
state-sector. 
TABLE 1 
 Composition of urban employment, selected criteria and provinces, 2010/2012 
 China 
2010 
Sichuan 
2010 
Gansu 
2010 
Qinghai 
2010 
TAR 
2010 
S/Aba 
2012 
S/Ganze 
2012 
Q/APs 
2012 
% of employment 
registered as urban 46%	 21%	 22%	 33%	 30%	 24%	 19%	 n/a	
..% of reg. urban 
emp. in units 55%	 55%	 61%	 55%	 42%	 62%	 62%	 n/a	
..% of reg. urban 
emp. in p/e or s/e 45%	 45%	 39%	 45%	 58%	 38%	 38%	 n/a	
….% of urban units 
in state-sector 50%	 60%	 75%	 75%	 93%	 83%	 91%	 84%	
….% of urban units 
in non-state units 50%	 40%	 25%	 25%	 7%	 17%	 9%	 16%	
In formal as  % o f  
to ta l  urban (es t . )   32%	 11%	 27%	 25%	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Source: calculated from CSY (2011: tables 4-2 and 4-6), SSY (2013: tables 4-7 and 4-8) and QSY 
(2013: table 24-1). 
 
The situation in the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR is similar to the 
TAR. Interpretive detours are required in dealing with the data for Qinghai 
given the limited publically available employment data disaggregated below the 
provincial level. The only significant data in the Qinghai Statistical Yearbooks 
are aggregated at the level of autonomous prefectures (APs), as per the QSY 
(2014: chapter 24),16 which do identify most of the Tibetan areas given that, of 
the six autonomous prefectures of Qinghai, five are Tibetan and one is 
Tibetan-Mongolian (TMAP).17  As discussed in Fischer (2008), the problem 
with this aggregation of Tibetan areas is that it includes the Haixi/Tsonub 
TMAP. This prefecture is sparsely populated besides the large mining town of 
Golmud (Geermu) – which has a population of 130,000, almost entirely non-
Tibetan – or else a variety of smaller equivalents, such as towns related to 
resource exploitation in the Tsaidam Basin. The TAP of Haibei/Tsojang also 
has a much higher share of non-Tibetans than is the norm in the four more 
                                                
16 County-level data is provided in the QSYs (in chapter 25), although these are too general to 
provide much insight and the employment data in this chapter appear to be highly inaccurate. 
17 In QSY (2013), the same aggregation was identified as ‘Tibetan-inhabited areas’ rather than 
‘autonomous prefectures’, although that denomination was also misleading because some 
Tibetan autonomous counties exist outside these six autonomous prefectures. 
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densely populated TAPs to the south (Haidong/Tsolho, Huangnan/Malho, 
Golok and Yushu).  
Keeping these qualifications in mind, there were about 211,000 urban unit 
employees in the six Qinghai APs in 2013. In 2012, 84 percent of this unit 
employment was in state-owned units, 1.5 percent in urban collective-owned 
units, and 14 percent in ‘other units’, which would be the non-state corporate 
units described previously. Provincially, 71 percent of urban unit employment 
was in state-owned units and 26 percent in ‘other units’ in 2012.18 These 
proportions shifted radically in 2013, although this appears to have been largely 
due to a reclassification of state-owned units into ‘other’ units, most likely with 
respect to SOEs being re-classified as share-holding or limited liability 
corporations, particularly in the resource sector, perhaps due to a partial to full 
privatisation of some of these units.19 No data is provided on overall urban 
employment in these TAPs, although extrapolating on the basis of various 
assumptions, it is likely that such urban unit employment accounted for more 
than half of total urban employment, similar to the TAR in the mid-2000s.20  
The problem with evaluating these numbers and proportions, however, is 
the fact that these urban unit employees – especially the non-state unit 
employees – would have been concentrated in the mining towns of Haibei and 
Haixi, as noted above. These towns are also where the Han Chinese residing in 
these TAPs are concentrated. Publically available data are not available to 
disaggregate these employment statistics, although we can deduce that the 
availability of urban unit employment in the four remaining TAPs where 
Tibetans are dominant was even more limited than the above shares suggest. 
The degree to which Han Chinese dominated such employment is less clear, 
although given that the Han in these TAPs are mostly urban and economically 
active, as in the TAR, it is clear how they place a strong pressure on – and 
probably dominate – the limited availability of urban employment options for 
Tibetan graduates in these TAPs, as argued by Fischer (2009) based on earlier 
fieldwork in Qinghai and the TAR.21    
                                                
18 Calculated from QSY (2013: table 24-1). 
19 The 2013 data, in QSY (2014), report a sudden increase in ‘other unit’ employment in the 
TAPs, from 29,800 employees in 2012 to 84,200 employees in 2013, and a corresponding drop 
in state units, from 173,800 to 124,300, resulting in a ‘other unit’ share of 40 percent in 2013. A 
similar change was reported in the provincial data of the same table, resulting in a share of 
‘other units’ of 44 percent for Qinghai as a whole.  
20 Assuming a labour force participation rate of about 50 percent of the population (as was 
approximately the case for the rural labour force in these APs), there would have been an 
active labour force of about one million people, based on a population of two million people. 
Given that there were 712,000 ‘rural labourers’, the urban employment would have been about 
300,000 people. In which case, urban unit employment would have accounted for about two-
thirds of total urban employment. Obviously, much of the regional private enterprise 
employment would likely concentrate in the core area in and around Xining, outside these 
TAPs. 
21 Tibetans were only 58 percent of the population of all six TAPs in 2013 (all minorities 
accounted for 74 percent), and the remaining 531,000 Han Chinese residing in these APs 
would have been heavily concentrated in towns and dominated the opportunities there, 
especially the non-state options. For instance, assuming that these Han Chinese in TAPs were 
80 percent urban (like in the TAR) and 60 percent economically active (which is probably 
reasonable, if not an under-estimation), and that those who were economically active were 
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In the Tibetan areas of Sichuan – mostly Aba (Ngawa) Qiang Tibetan 
Autonomous Preceture (QTAP) and Ganze (Kardze) TAP – the dominance of 
state employment in formal urban employment was very similar to the TAR in 
2012 (and to what was likely the case of the more Tibetan-populated 
prefectures of Qinghai), and dissimilar to the rest of Sichuan. The data for 
these two prefectures are easier to interpret given that there are no 
predominantly Han populated towns in remote resource enclaves of otherwise 
sparsely populated areas, although the eastern borders of both prefectures 
contain lower altitude zones where some towns and much of the Chinese 
population are concentrated. The data also appear to be more consistent and 
of better quality than the Qinghai data. In 2012, approximately 24 percent of 
the 502,000 people considered to be economically active in Aba TAP were 
classified as urban employed, or about 122,000 people. Among these urban 
employed, about 62 percent were employed in urban units, of which 83 
percent were in state-owned units, with most of the remainder in ‘other’ (non-
state or non-collective) units. Similarly, approximately 19 percent of the 
643,000 people who were economically active in Ganze (Kardze) TAP were 
classified as urban employed, or 123,000 people, and among these urban 
employed, 62 percent worked in urban units, 91 percent of whom worked in 
state-owned urban units. Considering that much of the ‘other’ urban unit 
employment was likely concentrated in the lower altitude, largely Chinese 
dominated eastern edge of both prefectures, the dominance of the state-sector 
in urban unit employment in the definitively Tibetan highlands would have 
been even greater than these shares indicate.  
The main difference between these TAPs of Sichuan and Qinghai and the 
TAR was the much larger share of private enterprise and self-employment in 
registered urban employment in the TAR. In this respect, the shares of Aba 
and Ganze were closer to the norm of other western provinces. Indeed, they 
were lower than the norm, which is probably explained by the fact that much 
of such employment congregates in the provincial centres outside of these 
TAPs (i.e. Chengdu and Xining), whereas it gathers in Lhasa in the TAR. The 
very rapid expansion of these more informal types of employment in the TAR 
(as discussed further below) has been exceptional across all the cases (if it is 
not simply an artefact of differences in statistical reporting)22 and is probably 
related to the explosive increase in tourism and related petty trading activity, 
much of which was occupied by non-Tibetans. Similarly, the particularly high 
share of the state-sector in urban unit employment in the TAR (up to 2012) 
was also probably related to the exceptionally subsidized circumstances of the 
province in recent years (e.g. see Fischer 2015). Conversely, the prefecture 
figures for Qinghai and Sichuan do not reflect the urban unit employment 
                                                                                                                        
actually employed (because otherwise they would leave), this would imply that these Han 
Chinese accounted for about 240,000 of the estimated 300,000 urban employees in these TAPs 
(as calculated in the footnote above), leaving only 60,000 for Tibetans and other minorities, 
which would have been concentrated in the four Tibetan-dominated TAPs. 
22 If the TAR data includes what would elsewhere be treated as purely informal (e.g. 
unregistered) forms of employment, and if the Aba and Ganzi data do not include such 
employment (correspondent to what appears to be the case at the provincial level of Sichuan), 
then the proportions of private enterprise and self-employment to total employment would in 
fact be quite similar. 
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opportunities for Tibetans outside these TAPs but within the same province, 
such as in the capital cities where many of the employment opportunities for 
tertiary-level graduates would be concentrated (or else in Beijing). However, 
most of these opportunities are beyond the reach of the average Tibetan 
university or vocational college graduate since they require excellent Chinese 
skills and degrees from top institutions. Moreover, the numbers involved are 
unlikely to significantly alter the broader structural picture of very limited 
urban unit employment opportunities facing Tibetan graduates. As discussed 
further below, recruitment adverts also show that the vast majority of 
government positions mandating any form of Tibetan language skills are 
located in Tibetan prefectures. 
1.3 Structural changes in urban employment over time, 
focused on the TAR 
The historical trends of the TAR can offer some further insight into the 
evolution of this setting of very limited non-state graduate employment 
opportunities in the Tibetan areas (keeping in mind the differences between 
the TAR and other Tibetan areas, as discussed above). As shown in figure 1 for 
data from 1993 to 2014, the notable development in the TAR was the rapid 
increase in private enterprise and self-employment (as shown by the shaded 
area) parallel to the continued dominance of the state sector within formal 
urban unit employment up to 2012 (as shown by the thick dotted line). The 
latter dominance had not changed over the course of rapid urban development 
since the mid-1990s. In fact, it worsened up to 2012, with a shrinking share of 
non-state unit employment up to 2012 due to a stagnating number of such 
employees from 2001 onwards, even while the state sector was undergoing 
retrenchment and restructuring from about 2001 to 2005. 
The phenomenal increase in registered urban employment in the TAR 
started after the 1990s and especially from 2006 onwards (note that the railway 
opened in 2006), from 225,625 people in 2000, to 315,770 people in 2005, 
530,889 in 2010, and 799,095 in 2014. This increase followed a period in the 
1990s when urban employment was stagnant (and hence falling as a share of 
total provincial employment, given relatively rapid population growth). Indeed, 
total urban employment apparently fell in 1998 despite the beginning of rapid 
urban-centred growth at that time.23 Moreover, despite the fact that such rapid 
growth was led by the state-sector from the late-1990s onwards, and especially 
in the early years of the 2000s (e.g. see Fischer 2005), urban unit employment 
(mostly state-sector) was also stagnant until 2005: the peak of urban unit 
employment reached in 1996, at about 183,000 employees, was only surpassed 
in 2006. Hence, state-owned urban unit employment fell rapidly as a share to 
total registered urban employment, from 79 percent in 1998 to 34 percent by 
                                                
23 Some of this might represent changes in statistical reporting, particularly in relation to 
employment reforms. For instance, based purely on informed speculation, it might have been 
the case that the registration and reporting of informal employment was not as strict or precise 
prior to this time and hence some of the subsequent increase of employment might represent 
the reporting (and hence visibility) of erstwhile informal employment. 
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2014 (and more general urban unit employment from 87 percent to 41 
percent).  
FIGURE 1 
 Urban employment, TAR, 1993-2014 (numbers of employees on left axis, referring to 
shaded areas, and percentage shares on right axis, referring to trend lines) 
Source: calculated from CSY (2014: table 4-5 and 4-7), TSY (2015: tables 3-3 and 3-4), and equivalent 
from earlier yearbooks. 
 
Rather, most of the employment creation up to 2012 was in the more 
informal category of private enterprise and self-employment, which increased 
almost ten-fold from 48,021 people in 2000 to 473,636 people by 2014. It was 
in this space of semi-formalised (if not entirely informal) urban employment 
where most of the dynamics were occurring between the interaction of local 
Tibetans migrating from rural areas or else laid off from state-sector 
employment,24 and migrants coming from other provinces (some Tibetans, but 
mostly Han Chinese, especially from Sichuan). We unfortunately know very 
little about these dynamics besides sporadic surveys (e.g. see Ma and Lhundrup 
2008), extrapolation from related statistical sources (e.g. see Fischer 2005; 
2014, or Yeh and Henderson 2008), and/or qualitative fieldwork insights. 
However, as concerns this study, Tibetan university graduates mostly do not 
target this space of more informal employment in any case, or else only rely on 
                                                
24 The fine dotted line in figure 1 shows the rural share of total TAR employment declining 
from peak of almost 83 percent in 1999 to 63 percent by 2013. The total number of rural 
employed people continued to increase, from about one million people in 1999 to 1.3 million 
by 2013, with sharper increases occurring after 2003 given the government policy of increasing 
rural employment in the TAR (e.g. see Goldstein et al 2008, 2010), but this increase was less 
than the increase in total employment, hence the declining share. Some of this decline in share 
would represent rural-to-urban migration (i.e. the shedding of labour from rural areas), while 
some would be due to the fact that in-migration from other provinces, which is mostly urban, 
inflates the denominator of total provincial employment. 
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it temporarily, in waiting for opportunities to arise in formal (mostly state) 
employment. 
Urban unit employment started to increase above previous peaks from 
2006 onwards, although not as rapidly as non-unit employment until 2013. The 
state-sector share remained at well above 90 percent of total urban unit 
employment throughout this period, and even increased to a peak of 96 
percent in 2012, but then suddenly fell to 86 percent in 2013 and to 83 percent 
in 2014, due to a sudden increase in non-state/non-collective urban unit 
employment (i.e. the ‘private’ corporate units). This sudden increase in ‘other 
unit’ urban employment between 2012 and 2014 occurred largely in mining, 
manufacturing, construction, and a variety of services.25 As such, the increase 
possibly reflects a shift in the government’s approach to urban development in 
the TAR, in terms of involving a larger private non-state unit role in the heavily 
subsidised urban economy. We can speculate that, in addition to ‘greenfield’ 
employment creation, some of the increase might have occurred through 
partial privatisation of state-owned units or else through formalisation of the 
more informal private enterprises.26 This sudden increase in such private unit 
employment would have created a large demand for relatively skilled labour in 
a very short period of time, the implications of which require further research. 
However, from a broader structural perspective, the change merely brought the 
TAR more in line with the autonomous prefectures of Qinghai, as discussed 
above, without yet decisively altering the overwhelming dominance of the 
state-sector in formal employment (in particular considering that most of the 
private unit employment would have relied on subsidised contracting from the 
government). Also, while the increase in 2013 resulted in a slight correction of 
the urban unit share of total urban employment, this still remained at slightly 
below 41 percent in 2014 (lower than its share in 2010), reflecting a continued 
polarisation of urban employment in the TAR.   
Notably, state-sector retrenchment was also happening throughout China 
during the 1990s and 2000s, even to a more extreme extent, although the fall in 
state-owned unit employment was more than compensated by the rise of 
private corporate units, whereas this did not occur in the TAR (at least not 
                                                
25 The sharpest increase occurred in 2013. For instance, mining and quarrying by ‘other units’ 
increased from nothing to 3298 employees, manufacturing from 2168 to 6661 employees, 
construction from 64 to 9680 employees, wholesale and retail trade from 473 to 4594 
employees, etc. (TSY 2014, table 3-4 and TSY 2013, table 3-4).  
26 Unlike in Qinghai (as discussed above), it does not appear to have been the result of a 
reclassification of state-sector units (e.g. due to privatisation), given that employment in the 
state-sector was also increasing, although not by as much as the sharp jump in non-state units. 
Rather, Some of the increase might represent the reclassification of private enterprises as urban 
units, particularly given the slower increase in private enterprise employment in that year. The 
number of private enterprise and self-employment increased by 24,939 employees in 2013, 
versus increases of 39,913 in 2012 and 71,789 in 2011, whereas non-state urban unit 
employment actually declined in 2011 by 386 employees, and again in 2012 by 4,645 
employees, but then suddenly increased in 2013 by 33,377 employees. However, the bulk of 
the increase probably represents newly created employment. Conversely, some of the increase 
in these non-state units in 2014 might represent a reclassification of state-owned units in 
secondary sector activities, given reductions in state-owned unit employment in mining, 
manufacturing, ‘electricity, gas and water production and supply’ (probably related to the 
development of hydropower), and construction. 
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until 2013). For instance, the number of people employed in state-owned units 
in China fell from 113 million in 1995, to 81 million people in 2000, and then 
to 65 million by 2005, where it has more or less remained up to 2013. 
Meanwhile, the category of limited liability corporations only appeared in 1998 
and the number of people employed by them rose from 6.9 million in 2000, to 
17.5 million in 2005, and then to 22 million by 2010 (and then suddenly from 
38 million to 61 million between 2012 and 2013, again probably reflecting 
changes in the registration across various units). Employment in share-holding 
corporations similarly rose from 4.6 million in 2000 to over 10 million by 2010. 
The decline in the share of state-owned units in total registered urban 
employment in China was also not as pronounced as in the TAR, falling from 
55 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2010, because the overall increase in 
registered urban employment was not as rapid (i.e. total registered urban 
employment in China increased 50 percent between 2000 and 2010, whereas it 
increased 135 percent in the TAR).27 Similar dynamics can be observed in the 
western provinces of Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan, in the sense that the decline 
the state-owned unit share of total urban employment was less pronounced in 
these provinces than in the TAR, and was compensated by a rise in non-state 
unit employment (to a greater extent in Sichuan than in Qinghai and Gansu, as 
noted above). As discussed above, the particularly polarised context of the 
TAR was shared with the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR. 
FIGURE 2 
 Staff and Worker Employment, TAR, 1980-2014 (left hand axis in number of 
employees represented by shaded area, right hand axis in percentage of total) 
Source: calculated from TSY (2013: table 3-5). 
 
A slightly more fine-grained picture of the dynamics in the TAR can be 
gained from the data on staff and worker employment reported in the TSYs, as 
shown in figure 2. As discussed above, staff and workers are a subcategory that 
                                                
27 See Fischer (2007, 181-83) for further analysis of the data in 2004. Data for 2000 are 
calculated from CSY (2001, table 5-4). 
 23 
accounts for most of urban unit employment – those not included in this 
category seem to be the less regular (and less well paid) employees within these 
units. Similar patterns can be observed in these data, in particular the 
retrenchment of state-sector employment from the mid to late 1990s up until 
2004, and then the rebound from 2005 onwards, although almost entirely due 
to state-owned units up until 2012. Indeed, ‘other types of units’ – which 
represent the non-state/non-collective ‘private’ corporate units – declined in 
number after a peak of 6,587 employees in 2001, except in 2011 when they 
reached 6,906 staff and workers. These private units then jumped in 2013 to 
32,900 staff and workers, and then to 44,923 staff and workers in 2014. We can 
speculate that out-of-province migrants would have dominated this sudden 
addition of 27,827 new jobs in 2013 and then another 12,023 in 2014, precisely 
because of the private nature of the units involved, which generally precludes 
the practice of preferential employment, and also because these units were 
most likely out-of-province private units, hence with a strong preference for 
Han staff and workers. As discussed further below, local supply of 
appropriately skilled Tibetans would have had difficulty matching such 
demands in such a short period of time, although this of course depends on 
the nature of the particular industry. However, before this sudden surge, the 
‘other’ (private) unit share of total staff and worker employment had declined 
over the 2000s up to 2012 even despite retrenchment in the state-sector. Also 
notable is the gradual phasing out of collective-owned urban units in number 
and share, from 11,752 staff and workers in 1998 to 2,973 by 2014, more or 
less eliminating these units as sources of new employment. Hence, the state-
sector remained as virtually the only source of expanding formal urban 
employment up to 2012, and probably remained so for most Tibetan graduates 
in 2013 and 2014.  
1.4 Graduate employment in the Tibetan areas outside of 
the TAR 
Within state-owned units (or the state-sector), a reliance on public employment 
(versus SOEs) can be more specifically observed in the Tibetan areas outside 
of the TAR from reports issued by various universities on the employment 
outcomes of their graduates. This is shown in figure 3, drawing from various 
reports from 2013 to 2015. These reports adopt a slightly different terminology 
than the yearbooks, in the sense that they appear to include limited liability and 
share-holding corporations in the category of ‘private sector and self-
employment’, which presumably also includes the less formalised category of 
private enterprise.28 On the other hand, the reports distinguish between 
government work units and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which the 
yearbooks do not. 
                                                
28 The reports refer to non-state enterprises as minying qiye huo geti (private enterprises or sole 
proprietorship, i.e. individually-owned), but also at times as fei-gongyouzhi qiye (non-public 
enterprises). In contrast to the categories employed in the statistical yearbook, the distinction 
between ‘private enterprise’ and limited-liability or share-holding corporations is not clear. We 
have therefore translated this category as ‘private sector’ rather than as ‘private enterprise’. 
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FIGURE 3 
 Graduate employment by type of work unit or other (2013-2015) 
Source: calculated with data compiled for various graduate employment reports available at: 2014届高校
毕业生就业质量年度报告 (2014 jie gaoxiao biyesheng jiuye zhiliang baogao, tr. 2014 higher education 
graduate employment quality reports), jiaoyubu daxuesheng jiuye wang (Education Department 
Graduate Employment Network), n.d., (last accessed on 20 January 2016) 
 
Accordingly, the reliance on public employment in government work units 
was highest in the universities with the highest minority shares, while 
employment in SOEs was lower, and in joint ventures or foreign enterprises 
was very marginal. This was most evident in the case of Qinghai Normal 
University, where the minority share of graduates in 2013 was 44 percent and 
where 47 percent of graduates were employed in government work units 
(although the high public employment share is also to be expected given that 
one of the principle functions of normal universities is to train teachers). This 
dependence on public employment was even higher in teacher training 
institutions in Tibetan majority areas. For example, The Gansu Nationalities 
Teacher Training College29 located in Gannan TAP, which likely had a much 
higher share of minority graduates, reported in 2014 that 86 percent of its 
graduates obtained employment at a government institution (although again, 
this is to be expected of a teacher training college).30 Likewise, the Sichuan 
Minzu College31 based in Ganzi TAP featured a 54 percent government 
employment share among its graduates (despite not having a specific focus on 
teacher training).  In the case of Qinghai University for Nationalities, where 61 
percent of graduates were minorities (also in 2013), 36 percent of graduates 
were employed in government units, versus an average of 29 percent for all 
seven tertiary institutions in Qinghai (in 2013 and 2014). The proportion was 
                                                
29 Ch. Gansu minzu shifan xueyuan. 
30 See 麦可思《甘肃民族师范学院2014年毕业生就业报告》出炉 (maikesi ‘Gansu 
minzu shifan xueyuan 2014 nian biyesheng jiuye baogao’ chulu, tr. Maikesi’s ‘Gansu 
Nationalities Teacher Training College 2014 graduate employment report’ newly announced), 
Zhongguo gaoxiao zhichuang (China’s Higher Education Window), 10 Oct 2015, 
http://www.gx211.com/news/20151010/n7302302191.html. The ethnic breakdown of 
graduates was not reported. 
31 Ch. Sichuan minzu xueyuan,       . (see http://www.scun.edu.cn). 
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also lower for the Southwest University for Nationalities in Sichuan (at 22 
percent in 2014), whose minority share among graduates was much lower than 
at the institutions cited above (only 26 percent) and that disproportionately 
supplied graduates to the ‘private sector and self-employment’.  
In contrast, only 12 percent of graduates in Shanghai (in 2015) and 14 
percent nationally (in 2012-13) were employed in government work units, and 
much larger proportions were employed in the combination of SOEs, joint 
ventures and foreign enterprises (35 percent nationally). Similarly, although not 
shown in the figure, among graduates from Qinghai University, the province’s 
top institution with a lower minority share of graduates (29 percent in 2013), 
59 percent secured positions in at least medium-sized enterprises with 300 or 
more employees, whereas only 31 percent of graduates from the Qinghai 
Normal University and 39 percent from the Qinghai University for 
Nationalities secured such positions.32  
An additional predicament for graduates from Tibetan-medium degrees is 
that they tend to be particularly restricted in their career options given their 
narrow ranges of specialization in their studies. This predicament is 
increasingly prevalent outside the TAR, as analysed in the case of Qinghai by 
Zenz (2013). In principle, their superior knowledge of Tibetan language should 
be a competitive advantage for public employment in Tibetan areas given that 
article 49 of China’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Ch. minzu quyu zizhifa) 
stipulates that cadres in minority regions should have knowledge of the 
respective minority language. However, such principals are generally side-lined 
by the preference for Chinese language skills, which disadvantages Tibetan-
medium graduates competing with Tibetans graduating from regular Chinese-
medium degrees (who also benefit from non-language related preferential 
practices such as added points or residency requirements), let alone with non-
Tibetan native Chinese speakers. Advertised positions also often require 
college degrees that can only be studied through Chinese, and employment 
exams and related interviews are by default entirely in Chinese (except for the 
limited positions that mandate Tibetan language skills).  
The employment predicament of graduates from Tibetan-medium tertiary 
tracks is therefore twofold. Not only is their choice of career paths much 
narrower. Additionally, job positions that would appear to be predestined for 
them, such as administrative or teaching positions in Tibetan regions, require 
successful competition against highly trained Han or minorities from the 
Chinese-medium system. Ethnographic examples abound where Tibetan-
medium graduates were unable to compete against either Han or Chinese-
medium educated Tibetan applicants.33 However, this vector of disadvantage 
also faces Tibetans from Chinese-medium tracks given that they generally have 
weaker Chinese language skills than Han or other non-Tibetan applicants. 
Indeed, as argued by Zenz (2013: 186-190), the wider range of career options 
that are open to such graduates does not necessarily put them on a better 
                                                
32 Calculated from ‘2015年中国大学毕业生就业报告’ (2015nian zhongguo daxue biyesheng 
jiuye baogao, tr. China 2015 Graduate Employment Report), Ministry of Education, 20 July 20, 
http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xwfb/s5147/201507/t20150720_194510.html 
33 See especially Zenz (2013, chapter 5). 
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footing in comparison to Tibetans graduating with Tibetan-medium degrees, 
who might face less competition in more limited albeit specialised niches of 
public employment.  This is precisely when language-based preferential 
recruitment practices become significant. Often, the only chance for Tibetan 
graduates – especially Tibetan-medium graduates – is to target one of the 
highly coveted Tibetan-medium teaching positions in Tibetan regions, or other 
government jobs that specifically mandate Tibetan language skills.  
In sum, the employment horizon for Tibetan tertiary graduates – 
especially those from Tibetan-medium degrees – is disproportionately 
restricted to state-sector employment, and public sector employment more 
specifically, the alternative being in the less organized semi-formalized and 
generally lower wage sectors of private enterprise or self-employment. This 
leads to all or nothing prospects for graduates, insofar as employment in 
private enterprises or self-employment not considered appropriate, decent or 
dignified option for someone with tertiary degree. Hence, employment 
expectations are mostly placed on public employment, much more so than 
elsewhere in China. 
1.5 Graduate and recruitment surges since 2010, with a 
focus on the TAR 
The silver lining of the dominance of the state-sector in formal employment is 
two-fold. One is that public employment is the optimal sector for practicing 
preferential hiring, making it relatively easy for governments (central or local) 
to change tack if they decide to do so, with potentially large impacts in short 
periods of time on the (relatively small) labour force of tertiary educated 
Tibetans. The second is that, as indicated above, there has been a resurgence of 
hiring in state-owned units since the retrenchment of the early 2000s, starting 
in 2011 in the TAR and followed in other Tibetan areas with various degrees 
of timing and tempo. 
The hiring surge is evidenced for the TAR in figure 4, which necessarily 
focuses on this region due to lack of sufficiently disaggregated data for other 
Tibetan areas. The figure shows the annual changes in the number of staff and 
workers employed in state-owned urban units and, as an alternative measure, 
the estimated number of public sector recruitments in each year (based on the 
data sources discussed in the next section).34 These data are supplemented with 
estimates of what fenpei recruitment would have been before it was phased out 
in 2006, based on the numbers of tertiary and secondary vocational (Ch. 
zhongzhuan) graduates in each year (i.e. the graduates who qualified for fenpei).35 
                                                
34 The recruitment outcome estimate for the TAR is based on actual data for 2007, as 
discussed in section 3. Comprehensive outcome documents were not available for the TAR 
from 2008 onwards and thus hires were estimated by taking 85 percent of the advertisements 
for 2008-11, which is a reasonable assumption in light of the outcome data that we have for 
the TAR and other regions (e.g. for a subset, see section 3). Hires were estimated at 90 percent 
of advertisements starting in 2012 given that, from that year onwards, the TAR instituted a 
second intake round to fill positions left vacant by the first round.  
35 Past fenpei recruitment is estimated based on the eligible graduate population of tertiary and 
secondary vocational (zhongzhuan) graduates. For the former, only BA and dazhuan figures are 
available, although research student graduate numbers were quite low in Western China in the 
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These measures are compared to a measure of annual student intakes of TAR 
residents in tertiary institutions anywhere in China, which has increasingly 
diverged from the student intakes in TAR tertiary institutions (not shown) 
since 2012 given the increasing trend of Tibetans from the TAR leaving the 
province in order to study in other provinces (the latter measure also includes 
non-TAR residents studying at TAR tertiary institutions). An estimate of the 
annual number of TAR residents graduating from tertiary institutions 
anywhere in China is also shown, based on lagging the above intake numbers 
for all TAR residents by three to four years, multiplied by a factor of 0.9 to 
account for those who do not complete or else those who continue on to 
higher studies. The latter graduate measure is relevant given that public 
recruitment from at least 2007 onwards has been explicitly open to all TAR 
residents who graduated in 2006 or after from tertiary institutions anywhere in 
China, as further discussed below in section five. In contrast, graduates from 
tertiary institutions in the TAR would include a significant number of non-
TAR residents, who technically would not qualify for the public sector 
recruitments in the TAR.36 
FIGURE 4 
 Intakes and graduation from TAR tertiary institutions, public employment 
recruitment, and changes in state-owned unit staff and worker employment 
Source: CSY (2014: table 3-5); TSY (2000-15: tables 3-5, 15-6 and 15-7); 西藏自治区普通高等学校招生
                                                                                                                        
late fenpei years. Tertiary graduate figures also have to be estimated from intakes, because 
student figures for all residents of a region at institutions throughout China, which is the 
relevant figure, are only available for intakes, and not for graduates. Hence, tertiary figures are 
estimated based on new student intakes for all residents from a region 3-4 years prior to each 
respective year (averaged with equal weight given to three and four years prior), multiplied by a 
factor of 0.95, assuming a 95 percent graduation rate. Total new student allocations for 
residents of each region at tertiary institutions throughout China were obtained from Ministry 
of Education (MOE) educational situation reports for different provinces and years 
(http://www.moe.edu.cn). Secondary vocational graduate data are from provincial yearbooks. 
36 On a related point, see Fischer (2014: 260-65) for a discussion of a discrepancy in comparing 
schooling attainments between the 2009 population survey and 2010 population census, the 
latter that included temporary residents, whereas the former did not. 
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计划(Xizang zizhiqu putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng jihua, tr. TAR regular higher education intake 
plan) Xizang jiaoyu kaoshi yuan (TAR Educational Exams Institute), various years, 
http://www.xzzsks.com.cn; (for fenpei estimate) Xizang zhizhiqu jiaoyu gaikuang (TAR education 
situation) for 2003-06, n.d., Ministry of Education website, www.moe.edu.cn; see appendix for the 
sources of advertisement data. 
 
According to the recruitment data, the hiring surge in the TAR started in 
2011. Estimated hiring peaked in 2012 (at 12,060 recruitments, out of 13,400 
advertisements), and then settled to about 9,000 recruitments by 2015 (or 
around 10,000 advertisements), which was slightly less than the initial level 
reached in 2011. This was up from a trough of about 4,000 estimated hires a 
year from 2008 to 2010, and a low of 2,338 hires in 2007. The estimate of the 
previous fenpei recruitment was in between these two levels, at around 6,000 
recruits a year from 2003 to 2006 (increasing throughout). 
Considering the increasing numbers of graduating students between these 
years, the resurgence of hiring in 2011 effectively represented a return to the 
fenpei norm, except at a higher number of graduating students. Estimated hires 
slightly exceeded the number of TAR resident graduates anywhere in China 
from 2011 to 2014 (by a significant margin in 2012). However, actual hires fell 
below the TAR resident graduate measure in 2015. The surplus in hiring from 
2011 to 2014 might well have been designed to make up for some TAR 
resident graduates who were not hired in the intervening years since the end of 
fenpei in 2006, particularly that there was much less recruitment than graduates 
between 2007 and 2010, when the annual number of graduates was increasing 
rapidly (reflecting, with a four year lag, the increased intakes of students earlier 
in the decade, before the fenpei was abolished). Nonetheless, compared with the 
TAR resident graduate numbers, overall public sector hiring between 2007 and 
2015 fell short by around 7-8,000 jobs, despite the much-touted employment 
guarantee that started in 2011. In light of the estimated increase in the number 
of TAR resident graduates projected from 2016-18, the shortfall that appeared 
in 2015 suggests that the state has already been facing challenges in maintaining 
its new employment guarantee to such graduates. As discussed further in the 
fifth section, it will undoubtedly need to increase public recruitment further if 
it is to continue honouring the employment guarantee promise to TAR 
resident graduates. Indeed, the sudden rise in non-state corporate employment 
in 2013 and continued in 2014 was probably orchestrated to address this 
situation.  
The state-sector staff and worker employment data (the thick black line) 
show different trends, offering a different perspective on these employment 
dynamics. Annual change in state-sector staff and worker employment surged 
in 2012 and 2013, when it reached almost double the number of recruitments 
in 2012 and more than double in 2013 (e.g. 21,158 additional employees in 
2013). However, it was only one third of recruitments when recruitments 
surged in 2011, and then it grinded to a halt in 2014, with an increase of only 
794 employees, despite the sustained level of recruitments. A similar one-off 
increase in staff and worker employment occurred in 2005, well above the 
estimated number of fenpei recruitment in that year. During the lull years of 
2007-10, employment changes exceeded recruitments, besides in 2008. The lag 
in the increase in employment relative to the recruitments in 2011-12 might be 
explained by the fact that those recruited in 2011 only started their 
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employment in 2012. However, the much higher increase in employment in 
2012-13 (as in 2005, 2007 and 2009-10) might also be explained by 
employment in SOEs (which might or might not tend to employ Tibetans),37 
or else by transfers from outside of the province instead of local recruitments 
(such as often occurs at the cadre level). The end of the employment increase 
in 2014 requires other explanations, particularly given that it contrasts with the 
sustained level of recruitments. It would likely be explained by attrition to the 
stock of state sector employment, such as through lay-offs, outward transfers, 
or retirements. Indeed, it seems that much of the retrenchment that occurred 
in the early 2000s occurred through early retirements (forced or otherwise). 
Alternatively, it might represent a reclassification of some SOE employment as 
share holding employment, as discussed above. 
All of this highlights the importance of the new data on government 
recruitment advertisements and hiring outcomes. They offer us key insights 
into what might be going on in various Tibetan areas during this period of 
resurgent public employment, at least in terms of the ‘flow’ variable of new 
additions to public employment, even if not the ‘stock’ of pre-existing 
employment (or attrition of this stock). Keeping the latter unknowns in mind, 
the advertisement data can indicate the evolution of explicit or implicit 
preferential practices in hiring for public employment (over a short but 
decisive period of time). Explicit in this sense refers to the use of language or 
degree specifications, whereas implicit refers to other specifications such as 
local residency. The explicit use of language specifications can also reveal 
government attitudes (usually local governments) towards Tibetan language 
and Tibetan-medium education, and the extent to which they are given a place 
in governance. Alternatively, the results of job recruitments offer some insight 
into the degree of representation that effectively results from either these or 
other channels, such as the intent of the government to maintain a degree of 
minority representation in the public sector regardless of preferentiality 
practices. 
2   Data Sources and Recruitment Processes 
The new data sources on government recruitment are related to the routine 
advertisement of vacancies by local governments (provincial, prefecture or 
county), which happens once or several times a year. These are compiled as 
lists with greater or lesser amounts of detail, which have been posted online 
starting from about 2007,38 entirely in Chinese language, and they are the same 
as the printed versions that circulate throughout China’s tertiary institutions. 
They provide for a far greater degree of detail and precision than that available 
in the official statistics found in provincial or national yearbooks because each 
advertised job position consists of a separate line in these spread sheets or 
                                                
37 For instance, the authors received anecdotal insights from conversations with journalists 
who visited the TAR in September 2015 of an expansion of Tibetan medicine companies 
employing Tibetan medical school graduates as assembly line workers.  
38 This refers to intakes with detailed job description tables. General recruitment 
announcements with only total figures are available as early as 2005 (for Qinghai), but are of 
no use for analysing preferential practices. 
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tables, containing various amounts of detail, but always specifying the required 
tertiary degree, the work unit and location, and additional requirements or 
special comments (e.g. Tibetan language skills). In some cases, actual hiring 
outcomes are also posted on line, often with surprising detailed and candid 
information. 
Zenz (2013) made the first attempt to systematically gather and analyse 
these official online recruitment advertisements from various sources on the 
Chinese internet – see the appendix for a complete set of hyperlinks to the 
source documents. The earliest online documents with sufficiently 
disaggregated data that he could retrieve contained data from 2007, although a 
comprehensive availability of online documentation for all provinces only 
started around 2010-11. Comparisons between regions in this paper are 
therefore limited to the period from 2011 to 2015. Data availability also differs 
by employment category. For example, Qinghai’s civil service recruitment 
documents are available from 2007, whereas its comprehensive public service 
documentation is only obtainable from 2011 onwards.  
Recruitment advertisement documents initially appear on the government 
websites of each region, typically as downloadable Excel spreadsheets or 
HTML tables. They then quickly spread across career or local news-related 
media websites. In some instances, the government versions are often no 
longer accessible after a certain amount of time, but copies of them typically 
continue to be available elsewhere, such as on private websites that specialize 
in career assistance. These sites have an interest to provide comprehensive and 
reliable information to their clientele, to which they try to sell career-related 
services such as recruitment exam preparation courses. We have never come 
across documents or announcements that appeared to have been intentionally 
altered, although some differed in their formatting or, in a few uncommon 
cases, provided shorter summaries of more comprehensive data. In some 
recent instances, governments started to put passwords on spreadsheet files or 
to write-protect them in order to prevent tampering, although a comparison of 
different online files pertaining to the same intake would readily reveal any 
alterations (which we never came across). Some of the oldest documents are 
only available on public document storage sites such as wenku.baidu.com or 
www.doc88.com, where private persons would have likely uploaded them. By 
comparing the style, layout and language of documents, one can ascertain their 
authenticity to some degree, and there would seem to be no apparent 
immediate benefit for someone to change them. Moreover, the total amount of 
positions advertised and in some cases other details can be corroborated with 
news articles describing the announcement of the recruitment round. In any 
case, only a very small subset of the older data was retrieved from such 
sources.  
These documents were systematically retrieved for all Tibetan regions, 
including those outside the TAR (besides Dechen/Deqin TAP in Yunnan, 
which was excluded because of the poor quality of the data in its documents). 
The data was then cleaned and compiled (by the co-author Adrian Zenz). This 
was done by parsing through tens of thousands of individual entries, which 
allowed for a detailed analysis of Tibetan language or other requirements. 
Moreover, in instances where outcome documents are available, there is often 
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a detailed trail of documentation from recruitment advertisement, to written 
exam results, interview results, and then to final recruitment outcomes, 
permitting additional verification. All of this increases the reliability and 
verifiability of the data analysis. 
2.1 Availability of Recruitment Outcomes 
In addition to the recruitment advertisements, documents detailing the 
recruitment outcomes at one or several stages of the recruitment process are 
also published online, such as the shortlists for interviews or the final hires 
made. By showing actual outcomes (or potential outcomes if the data refer to 
middle stages of the hiring process), they are an important way to verify and 
complement employment analyses, and to offer some inferences about the 
degree of representativity in the outcomes, regardless of whether preferentiality 
was exercised. However, the coverage of these outcome documents is partial 
and, hence, they are inadequate for comprehensive comparative evaluations. 
The reasons for this are multiple. Firstly, not all employment intake 
outcomes are publically disseminated. For example, nearly all of Qinghai’s civil 
service recruitment outcomes are only available to the applicants themselves 
through a login-protected website. In other instances when outcome 
documentation is made available, often only the first (written exam) stage of 
the process is listed and not the final hiring decisions. Overall, these limitations 
render it very difficult to systematically gather recruitment outcomes across all 
regions over sustained periods of time.  
Secondly, outcome documents vary widely regarding the amount of 
information they divulge. Many of them withhold an essential piece of 
information: the ethnic status of the recruited. For the 2007 intake, the TAR 
published detailed outcomes, including ethnic status and the job that each 
successful applicant applied for, which allows for detailed analysis. For 2008, 
the documentation only indicated ethnic status and total points (see below), 
precluding an examination of which shares of advertised positions were 
actually awarded, or how Tibetans fared in different employment categories. 
For 2009, documents were even less helpful, listing all applicants, and not just 
those who were actually recruited. Since then, outcome lists for the TAR have 
become essentially useless (for the purposes of this study) as they no longer 
specify ethnic status, nor the position for which the applicant applied. 
Similarly, none of the outcome documents for Gannan TAP that we have 
evaluated contain ethnic status information. This trend is not surprising 
considering the socio-political sensitivity of minority employment.39 
However, at the other extreme of the spectrum, some outcome 
documents are very detailed. Some contain such a plethora of details about 
applicants that privacy advocates would be alarmed: date of birth, place of 
registration, political affiliation, university degree, and even body height and 
other biometric indicators are all listed (at times in hidden spreadsheet columns 
                                                
39 As noted by Fischer (2005), the TAR stopped divulging the Tibetan share of staff and 
worker employment from the TSY (2005) onwards, relating to data from 2004 onwards. This 
was not specific to the TAR – similar cessations occurred in other provinces with large 
minorities around the same time, such as Xinjiang (e.g. see Fischer 2013).  
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that have to be manually made visible within the Excel software). Moreover, 
some provide all of the point results from each step of the recruitment process 
(see below), permitting a close examination of the process by which applicants 
are weeded out or how Tibetans fared at each stage of the process. One can 
even calculate what share of Tibetans would have been recruited for each job 
category if they had received more or less added points, or verify whether 
Tibetan language exams had the desired effect of privileging Tibetan applicants 
or applicants holding Tibetan-medium degrees. Nonetheless, the dissemination 
of such detailed information is highly irregular, even across different years for 
the same region. This erratic divulging or withholding of potentially sensitive 
information even within the same year alludes to the haphazard processes by 
which these outcome documents are published.  
In the middle of the spectrum, Qinghai’s outcome documents rarely list 
minzu status. However, they almost always show which applicants received 
added points (although the outcome documents of Yushu TAP rarely provide 
this information). Since minorities consistently receive five added points, it is 
easy to assign minority status to each applicant, which adds valuable 
information for analysis. However, this method is not without problems given 
that minorities are typically required to register their ethnic status with the 
examining authority within a certain period of time before the exam. To give 
an example, the 2011 public service teacher recruitment lists for 
Hainan/Tsolho TAP show that 30 percent of all interview candidates for 
Tibetan-medium teaching positions did not receive added points. However, all 
of them had distinctly Tibetan names (evident despite the Chinese character 
rendering). The most likely explanation is that they were Tibetans who failed to 
register their minority status and therefore forfeited their preferential 
treatment. Even so, that example appears to have been exceptional. More 
generally, the added points column appears to permit a roughly reasonable 
approximation of results. 
2.2 Categories of Public Employment 
These recruitment advertisement and outcome documents refer to different 
categories of public employment in China. These categories can be broadly 
divided into civil servants or cadres (Ch. gongwuyuan), and public service unit 
employees (shiye danwei). Civil servants are the most prestigious category. They 
are classified into different ranks from office workers (within various 
government agencies) to state-leaders. As in imperial times, admission into civil 
service is still very much equivalent to entrance into the upper strata of society. 
Apart from high remuneration and job security, civil servant positions come 
with administrative powers (xingzheng zhifaquan), dominating key power 
positions such as those within the legal system, law enforcement, public 
security, inspection bureaus, and all ministries and government agencies. As 
such, they often endow their holders with considerable social power. 
Civil service exams are quite uniform throughout the country. Even 
though specific exam questions are determined at the provincial level, exams 
consist of the same two sections: the administrative skills aptitude test 
(xingzheng zhiye nengli ceyan), made up of a range of maths and logics puzzles, 
task ordering exercises and other sections that test managerial and clerical 
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skills; and the so-called shen lun, an argumentative essay related to political, 
economic or societal topics of relevance to government policy, whose 
conception is inherently Confucian.40  
The government employment category of public service units41 refers to 
public institutions that perform public services, in areas such as education, 
culture, science, health, environmental services, or the state media. 
Additionally, various types of assistant staff positions (including manual 
workers) at core government agencies are also classified in this category. In 
recruitment documents, public workers can be referred to as technical staff 
(jishu renyuan), professional staff (zhuanye renyuan),42 or simply ‘workers’ (gongzuo 
renyuan).  
In contrast to the civil service system, public service employees are not 
employees of the state per se, but are directly employed by their respective local 
public institutions (which function nonetheless, at least nominally, as state 
institutions at the local prefecture or county level). These local institutions 
and/or local governments also fund the respective jobs (although of course 
these local expenditures are in turn generally subsidised by higher levels of 
government, especially in heavily subsidised Tibetan areas). A notable 
exception to this rule is in the TAR, where public service hiring is done at the 
provincial level. 
As a result of the sub-provincial character of public service positions 
(outside of the TAR), they are generally (but not always) less well remunerated 
and carry fewer fringe benefits than civil servant posts. Moreover, they 
typically do not come with direct administrative powers. Even so, the high job 
security makes them very popular amongst college graduates, including 
Tibetans. In particular, teaching jobs carry overarching ethno-symbolic and 
practical career-related significance for Tibetans, and many Tibetans, especially 
those from the Tibetan-medium education system, pursue teaching jobs not 
only for financial reasons but also for ethnic preservation. With this 
consideration, and because most advertised Tibetan-medium employment is 
typically found among teaching positions, which warrants separate analysis, we 
have calculated teaching jobs as a subcategory of the public service in this 
paper, with total public service positions (not shown) disaggregated into non-
teaching and teaching public service positions.  
Finally, there is another category of employment within the education 
sector. In 2006, the Ministry of Education initiated the ‘Rural Volunteer 
Education Phase School Teachers Special Job Positions Plan,’ abbreviated 
tegang jihua (or simply tegang).43 The aim of the initiative is to boost teaching 
staff in minority regions where the enforcement of nine years of mandatory 
education had been hindered by serious staff shortages. Salaries and benefits 
are comparable to those hired into regular government teaching positions, with 
the bulk of the funding coming from the central government. Tegang jobs are 
                                                
40 The words shen lun derive from a phase from the Confucian Analects, ‘shen er lun zhi,’ which 
mean ‘explaining, expounding, arguing, and reasoning.’ 
41 For instance, see the discussion of this by Burns (2007). 
42 In TAR government recruitment announcements, both types are listed together as ‘zhuanye 
jishu renyuan’. 
43 The full Chinese name is nongcun yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuexiao jiaoshi teshe gangwei jihua. 
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supposed to be converted to regular positions after three years at which point 
local governments become fully responsible for the provision of salaries. 
Originally, the program was due to expire in 2011, but it has so far remained in 
place (as of the time of final editing in December 2015). For some reason, the 
TAR never participated in this initiative and there are no indications that it ever 
undertook related recruitment. However, the tegang program has been a 
significant source of teacher recruitment in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and other 
Western Chinese regions. 
2.3 The Recruitment Process 
The recruitment process for all of these public sector positions consists of two 
stages. The first stage comprises the written exam (bi shi). Typically, there has 
to be a minimum number of applicants who complete the written stage and 
enter the interview stage (mian shi) in order to ensure that positions are awarded 
through sufficient competition. If this number is not reached (usually 2 to 5 
applicants), the position is removed from the list. While competition for some 
positions (such as those in provincial capitals) can be extremely high, 
competition for more remote or less appealing positions can be low. As a 
result, approximately 80 to 90 percent of positions are typically filled and the 
rest dropped (our analysis of outcomes indicates that 85 percent of advertised 
positions across a range of 25 recruitment outcome exams sampled from most 
of the Tibetan regions from 2007 and 2015 were actually awarded). However, 
most Tibetan regions analysed in this paper have been holding second or even 
third rounds of recruitments designed to fill such ‘vacant positions’ (Ch. konque 
zhiwei). For example, the TAR has been consistently having additional intakes 
from 2012 onwards in order to fill up vacant positions (Ch. kongque zhiwei bulu 
jihua). This should mean that the share of advertised positions that ends up 
being assigned should be moving closer toward 100 percent in more recent 
years. The number of candidates who therefore advance to the interview stage 
is equal to the number of positions multiplied by the minimum competition 
requirement. For example, if a region advertises five translation positions and 
each position must have at least three applicants, then 15 candidates advance 
to the interview stage (provided that enough apply), of which the top five 
(based on a combined written and interview score) will be hired. 
Local examination practices vary widely and commonly change from year 
to year. Typically, the interview counts for 20 to 40 percent of the final grade, 
and the written exam for the rest. In some intakes, applicants for positions 
specifying Tibetan-medium criteria are required to conduct the interview in 
Tibetan and may be given a choice of completing parts of the written exam in 
Tibetan. For example, Tibetan-medium applicants for the 2011 teacher 
recruitment of Yushu TAP in Qinghai could complete the subject knowledge 
section in Tibetan (although the general knowledge section had to be written in 
Chinese). In other instances, such as the 2012 public service teacher 
recruitment exam of Hainan TAP in Qinghai, applicants for Tibetan-medium 
positions were even required to complete their exam in Tibetan, or else receive 
zero points.  
Often, minorities will receive added points (jia fen) based on preferential 
treatment policies for minorities. Added points are usually added on top of 
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either written and interview scores (or both) in order to yield the final score 
(typically, the maximum final score is 100 points).44 In Qinghai, the jia fen 
amount is usually five points, whereas in Ganzi TAP in Sichuan, all minorities 
only receive one added point. Again, regional practices vary widely, but tend to 
be somewhat consistent over time within a region. Minority applicants might 
be required to register their minority status within a specified deadline with the 
examining authority in order to receive added points (e.g. this is practiced in 
Qinghai). This can result in situations where applicants with Tibetan names do 
not receive the jia fen points, as discussed above regarding Hainan TAP in 
2011. However, in most instances applicants for Tibetan-medium positions are 
listed as having received such preferential treatment.  
In the TAR, minority applicants do not receive added points, but benefit 
from a lower required points level (fenshuxian). The difference between the 
required threshold of minority versus Han points is set individually for each 
position, and may be as little as two or as big as 20 points.  In a substantial 
share of advertised positions in the TAR, no required points levels are set, 
thereby forfeiting any minority preferential treatment.   
In addition to language and degree-type requirements, the advertised 
positions also often specify local residency requirements, either from the 
province, or from the prefecture where the position is advertised. This 
effectively serves as an implicit form of preferentiality, particularly in 
prefectures where Tibetans are overwhelmingly dominant, although of course 
it does exclude non-Tibetans who might be locally resident and it is also 
sometimes designed with the intention to reduce competition from non-local 
Tibetans, such as in the remote pastoral areas of Golok and Yushu. In these 
remote areas, there is strong resentment against the lowland Tibetan ‘farmers’, 
i.e. those from the north, closer to Xining, who are perceived as dominating 
local public employment due to their superior knowledge of Chinese and 
higher education levels, in much the same way that Chinese are advantaged. 
The fiercest competition for desirable government jobs often comes from well-
educated Han (or other minorities) from regions with strong educational 
foundations, such as provincial capitals or their surrounding areas.45 In these 
cases, prefecture residency restrictions offer significant potential to increase the 
share of positions allocated to local minorities such as Tibetans. Indeed, in 
prefectures with majority Tibetan populations, residency restrictions are 
significant and, in the more recent job advertisements that we have been able 
to analyse, the residency requirements are not just limited to those who hold a 
current residency from the region (Ch. huji), but also include those who were 
original from (i.e. born in) the region (Ch. shengyuandi). As discussed in the 
previous section, all recruitments advertised for the TAR included this type of 
shengyuan requirement (with respect to education, not birth) since at least the 
earliest advertisements that we have been able to access and analyse (starting in 
2007). 
                                                
44 Exams are typically scored out of 100 points and count for 70 percent of the final score (the 
other 30 percent is based on the interview). 
45 See Zenz (2013, chapter 5). 
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2.4 Types of Tibetan-medium Employments 
As discussed in the introduction, Tibetan-medium specifications within these 
public sector recruitments are a particularly important means of practicing 
preferentiality by giving a decisive advantage to Tibetan applicants, especially 
those with Tibetan-medium degrees, arguably even more so than the added 
points or lower threshold practices. Moreover, differences between types of 
advertised ‘Tibetan-medium jobs’ in the public sector could have major 
implications for the employment prospects of different types of Tibetan 
university graduates. There are generally two types of Tibetan-medium 
employment: jobs that require a Tibetan-medium degree, or jobs that require 
candidates to possess various levels of Tibetan language skills without 
necessarily requiring a Tibetan-medium degree. The latter are typically referred 
to as ‘bilingual’ positions (Ch. shuangyu) in the job advertisements (and are 
likewise called ‘bilingual positions’ in this paper). 
The Tibetan-medium degree jobs specifically require a Tibetan-medium 
college degree, such as Tibetan language, Tibetan medicine, or Tibetan-Chinese 
translation (referred to in this paper as ‘Tibetan-medium degree positions’). 
This is the most restrictive possible requirement and more-or-less guarantees 
that the successful applicant will be a Tibetan who has passed through the 
various levels of the Tibetan minority education system. For instance, based on 
an aggregation of 21 outcome documents that have sufficient data to analyse 
these specificities, Tibetans (or minorities) were hired for 99 percent of jobs 
that specified Tibetan-medium degrees, and these jobs also guaranteed that all 
or nearly all of these recruitees had Tibetan-medium degrees. These positions 
need to be carefully distinguished from advertised positions that require 
applicants to know Tibetan language, such as an ability to teach Tibetan 
language in schools, but that do not actually require them to possess a Tibetan-
medium degree. Exam results (such as from the TAR in 2007) show that, in 
the latter case, many of the applicants hold non-Tibetan-medium degrees, even 
though most or all of them might be ethnic Tibetans. In the same documents 
mentioned above, Tibetans (or minorities) were hired for 84 percent of these 
bilingual jobs, although the share of recruitees with Tibetan-medium degrees 
was much lower (with a few exceptions, related to teaching). In comparison, 
Tibetans/minorities were hired for 58 percent in jobs that did not specify any 
Tibetan medium, and very few if any of the recruitees for these jobs had 
Tibetan-medium degrees.  
The requirements for ‘bilingual’ positions, and the enforcement of their 
requirements, vary widely. The actual language competency of applicants is at 
times tested through Tibetan language exams, but this is often not the case. 
Some positions require applicants to ‘understand both the spoken and the 
written language’ (Ch. dong liangzhong yuyan wenzi), which generally necessitates 
the applicant to have gone through at least some level of Tibetan-medium 
education. In rare instances, the minimum level of Tibetan-medium education 
is specified, such as middle or high school levels. However, such jobs will often 
attract Tibetans with significant amounts of Chinese-medium education. 
Even less restrictive are positions that merely require applicants to 
‘understand both languages’ (Ch. dong liangzhong yuyan or dong hanzang shuangyu), 
or even more basic, to be merely ‘familiar with Tibetan’ (shuxi zangyu). Such 
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positions are essentially open to any Tibetan with spoken language capabilities, 
which would apply to even the many so-called ‘sinicised’ Tibetans who went 
through all Chinese-medium education. In fact, as argued by Zenz (2013) in 
the case of Qinghai, sinicised applicants who at times merely retain a ‘shell’ of 
what the Tibetan community considers to constitute ‘Tibetanness’ are often 
the government’s favourite solicitors for such positions. Indeed, many 
positions that mandate an understanding of Tibetan specify either a degree that 
cannot be studied in a Tibetan department (e.g. law or economics), or even 
specify a Chinese language degree. All of these are included in the figures for 
Tibetan-medium positions in this study. 
The situation is additionally complicated by the fact that some Han and 
members of other ethnic groups who grow up in Tibetan areas might be able 
to speak Tibetan with various degrees of competency, and a few of them even 
go through the Tibetan-medium education system. This occurs mainly in 
Tibetan regions in Sichuan and Qinghai. However, their numbers are fairly low 
and exam results indicate that they are typically unsuccessful in competing with 
Tibetans for (various types of) Tibetan-medium jobs, although there are some 
notable exceptions.46  
Consequently, a definition of ‘Tibetan-medium jobs’ has to carefully take 
into account all of these variations. For the purposes of this article, we 
distinguish between only two types of employment: firstly, ‘Tibetan-medium 
degree’ jobs that explicitly require applicants to have completed a Tibetan-
medium tertiary degree. Secondly, Tibetan-medium jobs which mandate 
applicants to hold various levels of Tibetan language competency. This 
category is very broad, but we opted against breaking it down into further 
categories since local requirements vary widely, rendering cross-regional 
comparison extremely complicated at a more specified level of analysis. 
2.5 Data analysis and challenges 
The analysis of recruitment advertisements is not always entirely 
straightforward. Whereas the vast majority of positions advertised specific 
numbers of jobs for each degree requirement, at times multiple possible 
tertiary degrees were specified for a job category. In these cases, we have 
assumed that each degree specified was allocated an equal share for the job 
posting, e.g. if fifty jobs were advertised for a range of five possible degrees, we 
assume that each degree was allocated ten jobs. This is of course an 
approximation, although it was mostly limited to a few positions advertised in 
TAR documents from 2007-09. 
A second problem stems from job adverts that do not differentiate 
between teaching levels or Tibetan language or university degree requirements. 
This was mainly the case for public service teacher recruitment in Gannan 
TAP, where primary and secondary teaching positions were not clearly 
distinguished, nor were Tibetan language teaching positions versus Tibetan-
medium teaching positions of other (non-language) subjects.  
                                                
46 An example is a Ganzi teacher recruitment (tegang) exam outcome discussed further below. 
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 A third challenge arises from the complexity with which intakes occur, 
especially the public service intakes. The easiest and least error-prone region 
for data analysis is the TAR given that recruitment for both civil and public 
service positions occurs through one central document in two annual intakes. 
An exception took place in 2008, when there were three intakes, of which only 
the first was adequately documented. Consequently, we have overall figures, 
but no reliable disaggregated information about public service employment for 
the TAR for that year. Otherwise, the situation can be substantially more 
complicated in other regions. In Qinghai, civil service and tegang teacher 
recruitment is advertised in one annual batch for the entire province. However, 
public service recruitment occurs by prefecture, at times in multiple intakes. 
Since 2013, Qinghai’s public service teacher recruitment has been advertised 
centrally for the entire province. The data gathering is additionally complicated 
by the fact that, for all regions besides the TAR, some prefectural civil and 
public service jobs are advertised in provincial intakes, which are separately 
advertised by institutional category (e.g. law enforcement etc.). The implication 
is that civil and public service figures besides those of the TAR are potentially 
incomplete, although based on extensive searches on relevant government sites 
as well as the Chinese internet in general over the past four years, we believe 
that a majority of positions are reflected in our summaries. 
The recruitment analysis for Qinghai is additionally complicated by the 
fact that Tibetans make up only about a quarter of the population of the 
province, concentrated in multiple prefectures and counties (most of which are 
Tibetan autonomous areas). In order to group these areas, we use the term 
‘Qinghai Tibetan Majority Areas,’ or Qinghai TMAs for short,47 defined as 
including any TAP or Tibetan Autonomous County (TAC) with a Tibetan 
population that is more than 50 percent of the total population (adapted from 
Zenz 2013). This includes the TAPs of Hainan (Chabcha), Huangnan (Malho), 
Golog, and Yushu, and the TACs of Gangca (Gangchha; in Haibei TAP) and 
Tianjun (Thenchun; in Haixi MTAP). The Tibetan share of the total 
population of these Qinghai TMAs was 81 percent in the 2010 census.48  
The reason for not including other regions with a lower Tibetan 
population share is to enable a realistic analysis of Tibetan representation in 
areas that are definitively Tibetan (in the present) and hence that would have 
strong legitimacy in advocating for greater representation in public 
employment.49 Moreover, Zenz (2013) found that job postings that specify 
Tibetan-medium criteria tend to be very limited or even non-existent in 
                                                
47 Note that Zenz (2013) uses the term ‘Tibetan Majority Regions’, although we have opted for 
the term ‘Areas’ rather than ‘Regions’ given that the latter is connoted as a provincial level of 
jurisdiction, e.g. the TAR. 
48 The Mongolians of Henan County in Huangnan TAP were included in the Tibetan 
population count, because for all practical purposes they are like Tibetans in terms of Tibetan-
medium education and employment. At tertiary institutions in Xining, the other Tibetans 
consider them to be linguistically and culturally ‘Tibetan’ (see Zenz, 2013). However, 
Monguors were not included, although of course this could be subject to debate (as it was 
between the two authors).  
49 These include the rest of the counties in Haibei and Haixi TAPs, or else counties in Haidong 
Prefecture that have substantial albeit minority Tibetan populations such as Ping’an, Minhe, 
Huzhu, and especially Hualong and Xunhua. 
 39 
Tibetan populated areas that are not governed by a higher-level (county or 
prefecture) Tibetan autonomous entity, such as Hualong Country in Haidong 
Prefecture. For instance, despite Tibetans accounting just under a quarter of 
the population of Xunhua County,50 only a very small fraction of its job 
postings have specified Tibetan-medium criteria.  
Similarly in Sichuan, not a single Tibetan-medium government position 
was advertised between 2010-14 in Muli TAC, which is part of a non-Tibetan 
prefecture in Sichuan. For this reason, this paper defines the Sichuan TMAs as 
only consisting of Aba (Ngawa) and Ganzi (Kardze) TAPs. Likewise, only 
Gannan TAP in Gansu Province is included in this analysis as a TMA. Deqin 
(Dechen) TAP in Yunnan Province was excluded given the poor quality of the 
published public recruitment data. 
In the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, the data situation is very similar to 
Qinghai, except that civil service positions are advertised by prefecture. Some 
local civil service positions are also advertised in prefecture documents 
published by different institutions, typically with respect to jobs in the local 
taxation system (dishui xitong), the commerce system, the prison and re-
education system (jianyu laojiao xitong) and the quality supervision system (zhijian 
xitong).51 Another difference with Qinghai is that there were multiple intakes 
within each prefecture in some years. The documentation for Gannan is 
essentially the same as for Qinghai.   
Generally, the task of comprehensively categorizing and summing job 
postings for each Tibetan region is complex, time-consuming and prone to 
errors. While it is impossible to guarantee that all data presented here is 
complete and accurate, significant efforts were made on our side to compile 
figures that adequately reflect the officially published situation of public 
employment in these Tibetan areas. 
3 Evaluating public employment recruitment outcomes 
and Tibetan representation 
The analysis of these data is best started with the more partial data on 
recruitment outcomes. While these are much more limited, they nonetheless 
provide some very valuable and rare insights into actual Tibetan representation 
in recent employment, or at least in recruitments. The data on job recruitment 
advertisements, by contrast, allow for an analysis of formal institutional 
practices of preferential recruitment. As discussed in the next section, these 
formal institutional practices fall into two categories: Tibetan-medium 
requirements and local residency requirements. They influence Tibetan 
representation in the outcomes in very significant ways, even though they do 
not explain the totality of these outcomes, hence the logic of starting with the 
more limited outcome insights in this section. 
The analysis of recruitment outcomes in this study is based on a sample of 
24 outcome documents, including Aba (2 documents, from 2011 and 2013), 
Ganzi (10 from 2011-14), the TAR (2 from 2007 and 2008), and the Qinghai 
                                                
50 See Fischer (2014, p.114-17). 
51 Not all of these categories were represented in each year. 
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TMAs (10 from 2009-15). This sample gives a disproportionate weight to 
Ganzi (31 percent of observed outcomes versus a population share of 16 
percent), although the other regions represented correspond roughly to their 
population weight within the sample. The sample is also temporally 
imbalanced, particularly in terms of the TAR where the character of the 
outcomes probably changed significantly from 2011 onwards. However, there 
is no alternative given that these are the documents that provide adequate 
outcome data and we are fairly confident that the sample is roughly 
representative of the overall outcomes, especially for Tibetan areas outside of 
the TAR. The TAR stopped providing outcome data after 2008, although as 
discussed in the next section, they reintroduced job guarantees in 2011, which 
mostly likely sets its trends apart from other Tibetan areas from that year 
onwards. 
As discussed above, some of these documents only show if the applicant 
is a minority (versus Han), without indicating the exact minority. In these cases 
the population share of all minorities is used to calculate the representativity 
ratio (see below). Later, in the discussion of Tibetan-medium specifications in 
the recruitment advertisements, the population share of Tibetans only is used, 
given that this is the relevant reference group for assessing Tibetan-medium 
jobs and graduates. Two of the documents (both from Hainan) only showed 
intermediate outcomes, i.e. the applicants who advanced to the interview stage, 
but not those who were actually recruited. In these two cases, we focused on 
applicants who secured the top interview spots, correspondent to the number 
of positions available, as a reasonable approximation of the applicants who 
were most likely hired (indicated in the second column of the table as ‘t’).  
As shown in table 2, the share of Tibetan (or minority) applicants who 
were recruited (or who were top placed after the written exam) in the 
aggregated sum of these 24 documents averaged 69 percent of the total. A 
representativity ratio can be calculated by normalising this recruitment share by 
the Tibetan (or minority) population share, whereby a ratio of one indicates a 
recruitment share that is on par with the population share. A ratio of less than 
one indicates underrepresentation and more than one indicates 
overrepresentation. The representativity ratio of these 24 documents was 0.83, 
meaning a small but significant underrepresentation of Tibetan (or minority) 
recruitment in public employment relative to the Tibetan (or minority) 
population share (parity is represented by a ratio of one).  
Some underrepresentation is to be expected given the marginalised and 
disadvantaged status of Tibetans and other minorities, such as their much 
lower levels of schooling, in addition to other structural and institutional 
considerations including discrimination. Indeed, although a strong preferential 
or affirmative action policy might seek to attain a ratio of more than one as a 
means to redress underrepresentation inherited from the past, such policies 
more generally tend to result in lessening the extent of severe 
underrepresentation.52 In this light, the representativity ratio of 0.83 might in 
fact be indicative of a significant degree of preferentiality in recruitments, 
                                                
52 For more discussion on preferential and affirmative action policies, see the conclusion in 
Fischer (2014).  
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whether through language criteria specifications or other practices, given that 
in the absence of such practices, underrepresentation could well have been 
worse (as observed, for instance, in the 2003 staff and worker data for the 
TAR, as discussed above). Nonetheless, all else held constant, such an 
underrepresentation of hiring overtime would gradually erode Tibetan (or 
minority) representation over time; the result is perhaps better than what more 
pessimistic views would speculate, although it is also not sufficient to address 
chronic historical underrepresentation of Tibetans in the public employment of 
the regions where they are dominant. 
TABLE 2 
 Summary of recruitment outcomes from 24 documents 
Recruitment place and 
sectors * 
minzu/ 
result ** 
Total 
hired 
 (or top 
placed) 
Tib/min 
share 
of hired 
Tib/min 
repres. 
ratio 
Tib-med 
share of 
adverts 
Tib-med 
share of 
hired 
Share of 
Tib. hired 
for Tib-
med jobs 
Tib/min. 
pop. share 
(2010 cen-
sus) 
Aba 2011 c/s Tib/hired 410 41% 0.76 13% 11% 87% 54% v 
Aba 2013 tegang 
teachers Tib/hired 172 48% 0.87 0% n/a n/a 54% v 
Gangca TAC 2012 p/s 
teachers  min/hired 10 100% 1.30 100% 100% 100% 77% 
Ganzi 2011/2013-14 
p/s health-related Tib/hired 842 69% 0.88 83% 90% 71% 78% 
Ganzi 2012-2 c/s Tib/hired 331 52% 0.66 3% 3% 89% 78% 
Ganzi 2013-1 c/s Tib/hired 129 66% 0.84 92% 92% 68% 78% 
Ganzi 2014-1 c/s Tib/hired 226 95% 1.21 95% 95% 96% 78% 
Ganzi 2014-2 c/s Tib/hired 379 55% 0.70 11% 9% 100% 78% 
Ganzi 2012-14 tegang 
teachers Tib/hired 358 58% 0.74 9% 12% 100% 78% 
Golog 2014 c/s Min/hired 127 81% 0.87 28% 29% 100% 93% 
Golog 2014 tegang 
teachers n.i./hired 81 n/a n/a 56% 60% n/a n/a 
Golog 2013 p/s tea-
chers  min/hired 249 76% 0.82 35% 37% 99% 93% 
Golog 2015 p/s tea-
chers Tib/hired 152 85% 0.92 65% 66% 98% 92% 
Hainan 2009 c/s min/top 25^ 76% 1.01 26% 32% 100% 75% 
Hainan 2011-12 p/s 
teachers  min/top 49^ 61% 0.81 38% 29% 93% 75% 
Huangnan 2014 c/s  min/hired 102 78% 0.84 24% 27% 100% 94% 
Huangnan 2014 te-
gang teachers Tib/hired 13 69% 0.84 33% 38% 100% 82% 
TAR 2007 (all sectors) Tib/hired 2336 71% 0.78 25% 16% 100% 90% 
TAR 2008 (all sectors) Tib/hired 1262 82% 0.91 n/a n/a n/a 90% 
All documents vv - 7253 69% 0.83 34% 34% 85% 84% 
All docs (excluding 
TAR) vv - 3655 63% 0.83 41% 46% 82% 77% 
* c/s signifies civil service; p/s public service;  
** Tib indicates that Tibetans were specified in the document; min means that minorities were 
generically specified, hence all minorities are included in the calculations; hired signifies that 
the document specifies the final outcome of actual hires/recruitments, whereas top signifies 
the candidates in top positions after the written exam (correspondent to the number of 
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available positions) in the case of documents that only give the results of the written exam. N.i. 
indicates that no minzu information was indicated.  
^ Because actual hires are not indicated, the number of advertisements is used as a rough 
estimate of the hires and is indicated in parenthesis. This would slightly overestimate the actual 
hires in these cases.  
v Includes rGyalrong Tibetans.  
vv The average of all documents only includes documents with available data for the column. 
Sources: see appendix.  
 
This being said, actual changes in Tibetan representation would depend on 
what was happening to the other unobserved variables, e.g. the ethnic 
composition of retirements and transfers out of the region. For instance, in the 
case of the TAR, it is likely that transfers out of the province are 
disproportionately non-Tibetan and hence compensating for the 
underrepresentation in recruitments. Indeed, the data presented in figure 4 
suggest that this might have been the case in 2014 given that estimated 
recruitments were 9,720 (and had been higher than this for the two previous 
years) but changes in state-owned unit employment only amounted to 794 
employees, suggesting an strong attrition of about 10,000 employees in that 
year. If the attrition was disproportionately composed of non-Tibetans, then it 
could have easily compensated for the less than parity Tibetan representation 
in the recruitments, with a net effect of increasing Tibetan representation in 
the stock of public employment. However, all of this is speculative given that 
we do have access to data that would allow us to evaluation such dynamics. 
Another point worth considering is that, with the revival of public hiring 
at least in the TAR, a slight underrepresentation in public employment actually 
corresponds to an increase in the share of Tibetan public employment in the 
overall local labour force, particularly among the age cohorts that have been 
graduating around the time of these policy changes. Indeed, based on the 
estimates of graduate recruitments in the late fenpei period, shown above in 
figure 4 (see footnote 35 for methods of estimation), and comparing this to the 
size of the respective age cohort (22 years old),53 it is clear that the TAR was 
annually recruiting a higher percentage of 22 year olds into public employment 
from 2011 onwards than during the late fenpei years. For instance, using the 
advertisement data and assuming an 85 percent hiring rate (which was the 
average in the outcome sample), recruitments in 2015 amounted to almost 17 
percent of the 22-year old cohort in that year (and a peak of 22 percent in 
2012), compared to an equivalent ratio of 12 percent in 2006 (which would 
have been the peak of fenpei recruitments based on increasing enrolments and 
graduations during that period). It is also noteworthy that this ratio fell to only 
3.7 percent immediately following the phasing out of fenpei in 2007, and only 
6 percent in 2008, which offers some insights into the very austere 
employment conditions facing graduates during these transitional years, just 
before the outbreak of large-scale protests in Lhasa and elsewhere in 2008. 
Similar comparisons for the Tibetan regions outside the TAR are rendered 
difficult given the lack of equivalent data for the late fenpei perid. Nonetheless, 
                                                
53 This was calculated for the population aged 22 at the time of the fenpei graduation year using 
the 5-year cohort averages from the 2010 census (Tabulation 2012).  
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at the provincial level, Qinghai’s ratio of fenpei recruitment to 22-year old 
cohort in the early 2000s, when fenpei was being phased out there, was 
probably around 9 percent, whereas in 2014, the province’s ratio increased 
slightly about 11 percent. For the Qinghai TMAs, the ratio was quite low in 
2011, at around six percent, but jumped to close to 17 percent by 2015, similar 
to the TAR level. Again, the low ratio in 2011 might give some insights in the 
graduate employment conditions surrounding the on-going manifestations of 
protest in these years following the 2008 protests in these areas. 
Returning to the outcome results above and questions of representation, 
the Tibetan shares of the recruitment outcomes do not reveal any particular 
pattern across regions, sectors, or years. For instance, by excluding the TAR 
from the sample, the Tibetan share of hires was slightly lower (63%), but the 
representativity ratio was the same (0.83) given a lower Tibetan population 
share than in the TAR. In terms of range, the representativity ratios were as 
low as 0.66 for the second round of the 2012 Ganzi civil service intake, 0.70 
for the 2014 Ganzi civil service intake (for all minorities), or 0.78 for the 2007 
TAR intake (all sectors), while they were as high as 0.91 for the 2008 TAR 
intake,54 1.01 for the 2009 Hainan civil service intake (for all minorities), 1.21 
for the first round of the 2014 Ganzi civil service intake, and 1.30 for the 2012 
Gangca public service teachers intake. In other words, both lower and higher 
than average ratios are observed in the same area and in both civil service and 
teacher recruitments. 
It is worth noting that Tibetan shares of Tibetan-medium jobs that are 
slightly below 100 percent are to be expected given that some non-Tibetan 
minorities, such as Mongolians and Monguors (Ch. Tu), have become highly 
Tibetanised, meaning that they are native Tibetan speakers. Some Han who 
grow up in Tibetan regions also speak Tibetan, although by and large the non-
Tibetan recruitees for Tibetan-medium jobs are mostly from these other 
minorities rather than the Han. The only notable exceptions in our data were 
from the 2011 and 2013 Ganzi public service health intake, in which about 25 
percent of all Tibetan-medium positions were filled by Han applicants even 
though there was a Tibetan language exam, and the first 2013 Ganzi civil 
service intake, in which 24 percent of those recruited into Tibetan-medium 
positions were Han. In the two health sector intakes, the language exam only 
made up 10 percent of the total written score and the associated jobs could 
typically be performed without significant Tibetan language skills, in contrast 
to Tibetan-medium teaching jobs. In the first 2013 civil service intake there 
was no Tibetan language exam despite the specification of Tibetan-medium. 
Besides these exceptions, however, Tibetans filled positions mandating some 
kind of Tibetan language ability in most cases. 
                                                
54 The increase in the TAR from 2007 to 2008 might reflect normal variation, although the 
timing is conspicuous given that the uprising occurred in March/April while the second intake 
in 2008 occurred in September. In the aftermath of the uprising, the number of Han applicants 
from either inside or outside the TAR might have fallen, particularly considering that 
recruitment postings only increased moderately, whereas the change in state-owned unit staff 
and worker employment in that year was actually less than the recruitment postings, as shown 
in figure 4 above.  
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Tibetan-medium job specifications also do not necessarily guarantee that 
those hired are graduates with Tibetan-medium tertiary degrees – this usually 
requires stricter criteria. For instance, in the first 2013 Ganzi civil service intake 
mentioned above, 92 percent of the positions required applicants to have 
Tibetan language skills, but there was no related Tibetan-medium tertiary 
degree requirement and only 8.4 percent of the Tibetans recruited held such a 
degree.55 In contrast, the 2012 Ganzi tegang teacher recruitment required 
Tibetan-medium degrees for Tibetan teaching positions. Correspondingly, all 
of those hired for these positions had such a degree. Inversely, those with 
Tibetan-medium degrees often do not succeed in securing jobs that do not 
require such degrees. For example, only one of the 21 recruited applicants who 
had Tibetan-medium tertiary degrees in the Ganzi 2012 outcome secured a 
position that did not require such degrees. Similarly, none of the Tibetan-
medium degree graduates who applied for positions not specifically requiring 
such degrees in Aba’s 2011 civil service recruitment even secured an interview 
place. Nonetheless, as noted above, Tibetan-medium positions do appear to 
promote the more general employment of Tibetans even without the 
specification Tibetan-medium degree requirements. Indeed, applicants with 
Tibetan-medium degrees generally only apply for positions that at least require 
bilingualism, rather than attempting to compete for positions without any 
language preferentiality.56 This highlights the importance of bilingual positions 
in supporting Tibetan-medium education and also the degree to which they 
provide relatively protected niches of Tibetan employment. They also reflect 
the degree of local government political commitment and priority that is given 
to supporting Tibetan linguistic development. All types of Tibetan-medium job 
postings are thus important subjects of research in their own right, even if they 
only cover part of total Tibetan recruitment. 
3.1 Recruitment outcomes versus advertisements 
Comparing the outcomes to corresponding job advertisements, many more 
Tibetans were consistently recruited than the number of job postings with 
language or degree-type requirements (with a few exceptions). This points to a 
certain floor of Tibetan hiring that takes places irrespective of preferentiality 
through Tibetan medium requirements. For all of the documents, the share of 
Tibetans recruited (69 percent) was double the Tibetan-medium share of 
adverts or hires (both 34 percent); without the TAR, the difference is less, but 
still large (e.g. 63 percent versus 41 percent for adverts and 46 percent for 
hires. Moreover, Tibetans/minorities were hired for 58 percent of the non-
                                                
55 Likewise, in the 2011 Aba civil service exam, only 7.1 percent of all hired Tibetan applicants 
had graduated with a Tibetan-medium degree (whereas 22.9 percent had pursued a Chinese 
language-related degree, while the rest held degrees such as finance, accounting or law). Note 
that between 2010-2014, only Aba’s 2011 civil service exam results provided applicants’ 
minority status. 
56 For example, in Ganzi’s 2011 civil service exam (second intake), all applicants with a 
Tibetan-medium degree applied for a Tibetan-medium position even though none of these 
positions mandated a Tibetan-medium degree. None of them attempted to compete for a 
regular position. As a result, Tibetans made up 76.5 percent of all interview candidates for all 
positions, but only 36.4 percent of candidates for non-Tibetan-medium positions. 
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Tibetan-medium positions in the aggregated sample, which likewise 
substantiates this floor of hiring. 
A detailed breakdown by document or groups of documents is shown in 
figure 5, based on the data from table 2 and ordered from lowest to highest 
share of Tibetans hired. With the exception of the first 2013 Ganzi civil service 
intake and the combined 2011 and 2013 Ganzi public service health related 
intakes, the Tibetan share of outcomes was substantially higher than the 
Tibetan-medium share of job postings in all of the other cases. The difference 
was huge in some cases, such as the 2013 Aba tegang teachers intake, in which 
no Tibetan-medium positions were posted, but where 48 percent of the jobs 
were given to Tibetans (for a 54 percent Tibetan population share, hence a 
representativity ratio of 0.87 or close to parity). Similarly, in the second 2012 
Ganzi civil service intake, Tibetans accounted 52 percent of those actually 
hired (for a Tibetan population share of 78 percent, and hence a 
representativity ratio of 0.66), even though only three percent of job postings 
had Tibetan-medium requirements. Indeed, the floor for the Tibetan share of 
actual recruitments is evidenced by the fact that the share of Tibetans hired fell 
only slightly below 50 percent in only two instances (both in Aba), even in 
cases where there was little or no preferential language or degree requirements 
(although minorities would have nonetheless benefited slightly from the added 
points to the written exam results, e.g. one point in the case of Ganzi). 
FIGURE 5 
 Tibetan share of hiring outcomes versus Tibetan-medium share of advertisements 
Source: same as Figure 4. 
 
Overall, this shows that Tibetan medium requirements have been part of a 
wider variety of practices that have been securing Tibetan representation, 
resulting in more representative outcomes than the language specifications 
would imply, even though such representation has nonetheless been below 
parity in most cases. The Tibetan-medium positions nonetheless help bolster 
these shares given that, within the aggregated subsample of 21 outcome 
documents that contained Tibetan-medium job type information, ethnic 
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Tibetans/minorities were hired for 84 percent of bilingual positions and 99 
percent of the positions requiring Tibetan-medium degrees. Residency 
requirements help to explain part of the discrepancy, although not all (in 
particular because they often overlap with the Tibetan-medium requirements). 
Part is explained by the fact that some Tibetans simply compete well for non-
preferential positions (such as those graduating from the mainstream Chinese-
medium universities) or else that there is a lack of non-Tibetan competition for 
certain types of jobs (such civil servants in remote areas). Part is also explained 
by informal practices such as corruption or nepotism in many of these areas.  
The job postings data are nonetheless very useful to examine in addition 
to the outcome data for several reasons. One is that they offer a much more 
representative set of data given that the coverage of regions and years is much 
more comprehensive. Moreover, higher shares of job postings with preferential 
criteria generally correspond to higher Tibetan shares of actual recruitments, as 
can be observed in figure 5. In addition, as noted above, the average Tibetan-
medium share of total job postings across the outcome sample was almost the 
same as the Tibetan-medium share of actual recruitments in these samples (34 
percent in both cases for the whole sample, or 41 percent versus 46 percent 
excluding the TAR, as shown in figure 2).57 The share of Tibetans hired in 
these positions is also consistently high, as noted above, at 85 percent for the 
whole sample (or 82 percent excluding the TAR). As a result of all these 
considerations, the Tibetan-medium share of job postings gives a reliable 
indication of at least the minimum number of Tibetans that would be hired in 
a particular round of recruitment. 
4 Recruitment advertisements: preferentiality by Tibetan 
language requirements 
The very substantial body of advertised recruitment data is summarised in table 
3, with a focus on Tibetan-medium job postings for each year from 2007 to 
2015 and for all regions on which this analysis was based (the TAR, Ganzi 
TAP, Aba TQAP, Amdo Qinghai, Yushu TAP, and Gannan TAP). The total 
for each year and region is subdivided according to three employment types 
(civil service, public service excluding teachers, and teachers), and these totals 
and subtotals are also shown for the subcategories of Tibetan-medium jobs 
(i.e. a job with any Tibetan-language specification) and again for the more 
                                                
57 Note that differences in these shares of advertisements versus actual recruitments depends 
on the rate at which positions are filled in the Tibetan-medium and non-Tibetan medium 
categories. For instance, across all the samples, an average of 76 percent of all advertised 
Tibetan-medium positions and 82 percent of all advertised positions were filled (or 89 percent 
and 84 percent excluding the TAR). The proportion of the advertised Tibetan-medium jobs 
that were actually awarded in the TAR in 2007 was unusually low, at only 47 percent. However, 
this is arguably not representative of later practice in the TAR, given that from 2012 onwards 
the TAR held additional (second) intake rounds for unfilled positions, which would have 
significantly boosted actual recruitment outcome shares. For instance, in the second intake for 
the TAR in 2014, 980 vacant positions were re-posted after the initial recruitment, of which 
302 were filled. In the first 2015 intake, 1275 vacant positions were re-posted, resulting in 977 
previous applicants who reached the minimum points threshold in this round. Based on 
various extrapolations, we can assume that a large proportion of them were hired.  
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specific sub-category of Tibetan-medium degree jobs (i.e. jobs that require a 
Tibetan-medium degree). 
A general overview for each region is provided in a separate table, based 
on the aggregated, non-population-adjusted data, followed by a comparison of 
the results across regions. As with the previous section, it is also important to 
recall that these measures only offer insights into current intakes and do not 
give any information on the pre-existing stock or previous intakes. For 
instance, lower intakes in the beginning of the period studied might have been 
preceded by higher intakes before data was available, as is suggested by the 
fenpei estimate shown in figure 4. Or else lower intakes in one region might 
correspond with a higher stock inherited from the past in that region, 
compared to other regions. Hence caution must be exercised in interpreting 
trends or comparisons across regions from these data. 
TABLE 3a 
 TAR recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories 
TAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All jobs 3,200 4,648 5,500 4,680 10,313 13,400 11,559 10,800 10,010 
Civil service 1,383 2,084 2,859 1,471 4,160 3,885 2,745 2,055 2,000 
Public service (no teachers) 617 1,911 2,156 2,784 4,409 7,795 6,438 6,310 5,838 
Teachers 1,200 653 485 425 1,744 1,720 2,376 2,435 2,172 
.. All Tibetan-medium jobs 808  321 174 336 319 295 572 472 
.. as share of all jobs 25.3%  5.8% 3.7% 3.3% 2.4% 2.6% 5.3% 4.7% 
Civil service 78 70 111 20 48 22 40 14 35 
Public service (no teachers) 130  6 90 24 82 35 316 210 
Teachers 600  204 64 264 215 220 242 227 
…. Tib-med. degree jobs 208  120 156 280 287 288 560 466 
…. as share of all jobs 6.5%  2.2% 3.3% 2.7% 2.1% 2.5% 5.2% 4.7% 
Civil service 78 20 111 20 1 22 38 14 32 
Public service (no teachers) 130  5 72 15 53 30 304 207 
Teachers 0  4 64 264 212 220 242 227 
Chinese-degree (all jobs) 30  37 56 61 206 290 197 216 
Source: see appendix. 
 
Public sector recruitment in the TAR (table 3a) was reinvigorated in 2011, 
corresponding to the policy shift announced by the TAR government in that 
year to (re-)guarantee graduate employment, as discussed in the introduction 
and in the next section. Advertised recruitments approximately doubled, from 
a plateau of around 5,000 a year from 2008 to 2010, to over 10,000 a year from 
2011 up until the most recent data for 2015. As discussed above with respect 
to figure 4, the estimated level of fenpei-related recruitments in the final years of 
fenpei up to 2006 was higher than the trough from 2007 to 2010.  
Correspondingly, the resurgence of public sector hiring from 2011 
onwards would partly represent a return to previous levels of hiring, 
augmented by the higher numbers of tertiary graduates, and might have also 
been compensating for the shortfalls that occurred in the years immediately 
following the end of fenpei. The increase occurred across all job categories, 
although besides a civil service hiring surge in 2011-12, the strongest sustained 
increases were in the administratively less powerful and also less costly public 
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service category (including teachers), especially from 2012 onwards. The share 
of public service adverts (not including teachers) in particular increased from 
19 percent of the total in 2007 to 58 percent in 2012 and remained at that share 
up to 2015.  
In contrast to this general hiring surge, the Tibetan medium job adverts 
remained very limited and even fell in number relative to 2007 (again, we 
cannot speak of trends before 2007 because of a lack of prior data). In the 
context of the general hiring surge, Tibetan-medium share of adverts fell from 
around one quarter in 2007 to below 5 percent from 2010 onwards (except in 
2014, when the share was slightly above 5 percent). Also, since 2010 almost all 
of these Tibetan-medium adverts were specifically for positions that required a 
Tibetan-medium degree. Indeed, all of the Tibetan-medium civil service and 
teaching adverts fell into this case during these years. This indicates that 
Tibetan-medium positions came to be restricted to only specialized niches that 
explicitly required Tibetan-medium degrees, such as translation or teaching 
Tibetan literature. 
TABLE 3b 
 Ganzi TAP recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories 
TAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All jobs   1,917 1,535 2,274 2,703 1,759 3,018 1,773 
Civil service   399 281 807 833 343 1,042 328 
Public service (no teachers)   876 852 1,080 1,440 961 1,567 1,152 
Teachers   642 402 387 430 455 409 293 
.. All Tibetan-medium jobs    156 211 189 126 245 148 
.. as share of all jobs    10,2% 9.3% 7.0% 7.2% 8.1% 8.3% 
Civil service   65 6 98 69 27 152 72 
Public service (no teachers)    27 31 68 43 43 28 
Teachers    123 82 52 56 50 48 
…. Tib-med. degree jobs    104 86 66 58 87 61 
…. as share of all jobs    6.8% 3.8% 2.4% 3.3% 2.9% 3.4% 
Civil service   7 6 6 10 10 23 12 
Public service (no teachers)    14 12 33 19 39 21 
Teachers    84 68 23 29 25 28 
Chinese-degree (all jobs)    143 216 161 146 138 52 
Source: see appendix. 
 
While the trends in Ganzi (table 3b) were not as clear as in the TAR, there 
was a definite increase in advertisements in 2012 relative to 2010-11, which 
peaked in 2013, although this largely represented a return back to the level in 
2009, before which we do not have data. Indeed, by 2015 the advertisements 
had fallen below the level in 2009. Ganzi is also one of the regions with a 
strong Tibetan-medium component, although the Tibetan-medium share of all 
jobs nonetheless fell sharply and, relative to 2009, the fall was also nominal in 
2014-15. Besides one spike in 2013, Tibetan medium degree jobs were 
consistently in the range of six to seven percent of all jobs, which was relatively 
minor but more than in the TAR. 
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TABLE 3c 
 Aba TQAP recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories 
TAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All jobs   3,164 1,711 1,646 3,562 4,642 3,398 3,054 
Civil service 313  1,172 201 344 983 1,284 1,199 568 
Public service (no teachers)   1,206 842 784 873 1,928 1,154 1522 
Teachers   786 668 518 1,706 1,430 1,045 964 
.. All Tibetan-medium jobs   1,638 872 710 1,475 1,700 1,050 609 
.. as share of all jobs   51.8% 51.0% 43.1% 41.4% 36.6% 30.9% 19.9% 
Civil service 262  846 47 113 409 646 302 35 
Public service (no teachers)   424 319 305 365 372 204 63 
Teachers   368 506 292 701 682 544 511 
…. Tib-med. degree jobs   231 280 171 232 499 186 210 
…. as share of all jobs   7.3% 16.4% 10.4% 6.5% 10.7% 5.5% 6.9% 
Civil service 0  30 5 17 32 283 43 35 
Public service (no teachers)   25 41 58 41 74 28 52 
Teachers   176 234 96 159 142 115 123 
Chinese-degree (all jobs)   173 216 154 294 428 290 162 
Source: see appendix 
 
The trends in Aba TQAP (table 3c), also in Sichuan, were less clear. There 
appears to have been a slight increase in 2011-12, and then a one-off spike in 
2014, although this petered out by 2015. Moreover, the spike in 2014 was in 
large part due to a tripling of civil service recruitments in that year. Tibetan 
medium positions were much more limited than in Ganzi (between seven and 
ten percent throughout), and Tibetan medium degree positions were even 
more limited, generally at less than half of the Tibetan medium positions. 
These latter levels were similar to the TAR, probably reflecting the similar 
niche role of Tibetan medium degree positions in this prefecture. 
TABLE 3d 
 Amdo Qinghai recruitment adverts by year, region, and employment categories 
TAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All jobs     865 927 2,265 2,472 3,291 
Civil service 121 139 515 155 277 284 864 1,547 712 
Public service (no teachers)     215 229 623 433 1,349 
Teachers    152 373 414 778 492 1,230 
.. All Tibetan-medium jobs     239 284 938 725 1,188 
.. as share of all jobs     27.6% 30.6% 41.4% 29.2% 36.1% 
Civil service 24 52 135 38 71 67 311 405 217 
Public service (no teachers)     20 16 196 102 312 
Teachers    81 148 201 431 218 659 
…. Tib-med. degree jobs     60 64 94 39 211 
…. as share of all jobs     6.9% 6.9% 4.2% 1.6% 6.4% 
Civil service 0 9 2 2 1 0 0 6 0 
Public service (no teachers)     0 15 24 6 39 
Teachers    10 59 49 70 27 172 
Chinese-degree (all jobs)     118 19 128 134 311 
Source: see appendix 
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The Amdo Qinghai region (table 3d) differs from the two prefectures in 
Sichuan in terms of a definite sharp increase in recruitments from 2013 
onwards, although from a low level in 2011-12 and also from what appears to 
have been quite low levels before this, from the perspective of the civil service 
advertisements, which are the only ones available before 2011. The increase up 
to 2014 was due to a sharp increase in civil service positions from 2012-14, 
whereas public service job advertisements actually declined between 2013 and 
2014, although the latter and teaching advertisements then surged in 2015, 
while civil service advertisements halved. Moreover, as noted in the 
comparative section below, the one-off surge in civil service hiring in 2014 was 
almost entirely due to advertisements for security sector related positions, i.e. 
those in the prison system, legal system (courts etc.), law enforcement, police 
forces (including special police units) and public security.58 
The Tibetan medium trend was also opposite to that of Ganzi, increasing 
to over 50 percent of advertisements in 2015, and the increase was spread fairly 
evenly across all three job categories. The Tibetan medium degree share was 
fairly marginal, similar to the other regions above, although the nominal 
increase in 2015 was substantial. These were concentrated in teaching and to a 
lesser extent in non-teaching public service, and very few occurred in the civil 
service. Nonetheless, given that Qinghai has been very much leading the way in 
terms of the development of Tibetan medium tertiary degrees (see Zenz 2013), 
with an estimated total of 3,980 Tibetan-medium degree graduates between 
2011 and 2015,59 even the total number of 211 Tibetan medium degree job 
advertisements in 2015 appears was starkly inadequate to meet the demand for 
such jobs generated by the Tibetan-medium tertiary education system. 
The data for Yushu (table 3e) are similarly limited in time frame and they 
appear to show an increasing trend in 2014-15. The Tibetan-medium share of 
advertisements oscillated around one quarter of the total. The Tibetan-medium 
degree share was the highest among all of these regions, although it fell sharply 
in 2014-15 and, like elsewhere, it was concentrated in teaching positions. 
There was no significant upward trend of job advertisements in Gannan 
(table 3f), particularly in light of the collapse in hiring that occurred in 2015, 
which was due to a freeze on non-teaching public service recruitments and a 
sharp reduction in teaching recruitments. The prefecture had already 
announced that it would strictly limit local government job allocations in order 
to reduce unnecessary human resource expenses, and the drop in 2015 is 
explicitly a result of that decision.60 
 
                                                
58 The Chinese names for security-related recruitment categories are fayuan xitong, sifa xitong, 
gong’an jiguan, renmin jingcha, teshu jingcha (or tejing), zhifa dadui etc. 
59 Tibetan-medium graduate figures are estimated from new student intake figures of Qinghai 
residents in Tibetan-medium programmes across the country, obtained from the new student 
intake documents (Ch. zhaosheng jihua) of each respective tertiary institution. 
60 See关于取消2015年甘南州事业单位招聘的通知 (guanyu quxiao 2015nian Gannanzhou 
shiye danwei zhaopinde tongzhi, tr. Notice regarding the abolishment of Gannan prefecture’s 
2015 public service recruitment), China Political Education, Gansu subdivision, 14 January 
2016, http://www.gshzgwyw.com/shiyedanwei/zhaokaozixun/20160114/6666.html   
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TABLE 3e 
 Yushu TAP Recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories 
TAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All jobs     847 1,036 978 1,210 1,460 
Civil service 32 13 115 12 101 97 177 382 357 
Public service (no teachers)     166 326 274 351 544 
Teachers    352 580 613 527 477 559 
.. All Tibetan-medium jobs     251 222 317 278 272 
.. as share of all jobs     29.6% 21.4% 32.4% 23.0% 18.6% 
Civil service 4 0 0 0 7 29 29 48 95 
Public service (no teachers)     5 38 95 28 66 
Teachers    207 239 155 193 202 111 
…. Tib-med. degree jobs     166 187 140 81 111 
…. as share of all jobs     19.6% 18.1% 14.3% 6.8% 7.6% 
Civil service 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 
Public service (no teachers)     3 38 37 11 26 
Teachers    81 161 149 101 70 85 
Chinese-degree (all jobs)     137 119 139 126 193 
Source: see appendix 
TABLE 3f 
 Gannan TAP Recruitment adverts by year, region, and employment categories 
TAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All jobs    1,726 1,824 1,370 1,951 2,096 278 
Civil service   165 144 26 6 71 218 162 
Public service (no teachers)    1,176 1,041 883 1,506 1,164 0 
Teachers    406 757 481 374 714 116 
.. All Tibetan-medium jobs    119 69 68 49 101 83 
.. as share of all jobs    6.9% 3.8% 5.0% 2.5% 4.8% 29.9% 
Civil service   43 38 2 1 7 19 42 
Public service (no teachers)    0 0 1 0 26 0 
Teachers    81 67 66 42 56 41 
…. Tib-med. degree jobs    92 49 53 39 65 25 
…. as share of all jobs    5.3% 2.7% 3.9% 2.0% 3.1% 9.0% 
Civil service   12 18 2 1 7 10 2 
Public service (no teachers)    0 0 1 0 26 0 
Teachers    74 47 51 32 29 23 
Chinese-degree (all jobs)    89 49 17 16 17 16 
Source: see appendix 
 
4.1 Comparative Analysis 
For comparison, the results are normalised by population in order to facilitate 
cross-regional comparison, based on presenting the recruitment advertisements 
per 100,000 people (drawing from the 2010 census data, which provides for a 
superior measure of population than the annual surveys – see Fischer 2008). 
The population-normalised measures are calculated using the general 
population for overall recruitments, whereas the Tibetan population is used in 
the case of more specific Tibetan-medium recruitment. In terms of adjusting 
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Tibetan-medium shares of recruitment to their respective population weight, a 
measure similar to the representativity ratio of the previous outcome section is 
used: the shares of Tibetan-medium recruitment are divided by each region’s 
population share, resulting in ratio whereby one indicates that the share of 
Tibetan-medium recruitment postings out of total advertised recruitments is at 
parity with the Tibetan share of the population.61 This is not precisely a 
representativity measure given that, as analysed previously, significant numbers 
of Tibetan are hired in non-Tibetan-medium positions, although it nonetheless 
allows for an evaluation of the availability of Tibetan-medium recruitments 
relative to Tibetan population share.62 
FIGURE 6 
 All advertised public recruitment per 100,000 of the general population 
 
 
From this normalised perspective, it is clear that the recruitment numbers 
of the TAR were very much within the wider regional norm at the beginning 
and end of this period of nine years, as shown in figure 6. The TAR was only 
exceptional insofar as it led the general surge in hiring by one to three years (in 
comparison to the Ganzi, Amdo Qinghai, and Yushu respectively). With the 
exception of the sudden fall in Gannan in 2015 and the volatility in Aba, the 
general trend converged towards a higher plateau roughly in the range of 250-
                                                
61 For example, in Aba Qiang and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tibetan-medium civil 
service positions accounted for 11 percent of all advertised civil service recruitment (2009-14), 
while in the TAR they accounted for a 1.4 percent. However, Aba’s Tibetan population share 
amounts to only 41 percent and Tibetan-medium jobs serve this Tibetan constituency. The 
TAR on the other hand has a 90.5 percent Tibetan population share. Accordingly, Aba’s 
Tibetan-medium civil service recruitment share is adjusted from 11 percent to a ratio of 0.28, 
while the TAR’s share only changes marginally from 1.4 percent to 0.016.  
62 Note that in the case of these Tibetan-medium measures, we only use populations that 
would normally participate in Tibetan-medium jobs. Hence, Aba’s Tibetan population share 
was calculated without the rGyalrong people (estimated at 125,000 people), whose Qiangic 
language differs from Tibetan, and who normally do not participate in Tibetan-medium 
education. 
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350 recruitment advertisements per 100,000 people. If we would simply take 
the averages for each main province (the TAR, Sichuan and Qinghai), the 
Tibetan majority areas of Qinghai converged with the TAR by 2015, at around 
350 advertisements per 100,000 people, whereas those of the Sichuan TMAs 
fell to just under 250. The weighted average of all regions rose from 253 to 326 
advertisements per 100,000 between 2011 and 2014. TAR recruitment level 
after the 2011 surge was therefore not particularly high compared to the 
Qinghai and Sichuan TMAs, despite the fact that the TAR includes all 
provincial-level governance jobs in the total count (whereas province-level 
positions would be located outside the TMAs of Qinghai and Sichuan).  
Several major distinctions in these data are worth highlighting. First, in 
terms of job categories, there was generally a higher share of teaching 
recruitments outside of the TAR, similar shares of civil service recruitments, 
although in both cases non-teaching public service recruitments constituted the 
largest share of overall advertisements (and, presumably, actual hiring as well).  
Second, as mentioned above, the increase in civil service hiring outside of 
the TAR was substantially due to adverts for the security sector: the prison 
system, legal system (courts etc.), law enforcement, police forces (including 
special police units) and public security.63 These positions for all regions 
increased 3.3 times between 2011 and 2015, constituting 19 percent of all job 
advertisements in the TAR during these years, and 12 percent for all other 
regions. They accounted for a particularly high share of the increase in 
recruitment advertisements in all regions in 2012-13 and 2015. Security-related 
intakes in the TAR took place mostly within the public service, whereas they 
occurred almost exclusively in the civil service outside the TAR, where they 
constituted 49 percent of all advertised civil service positions in 2011-15.64 The 
highest security-related job posting share of all postings from 2011-15 was in 
Amdo Qinghai (24%), then TAR (19%), Yushu (15%), Ganzi (10%), Aba (9%) 
and Gannan (5%).  
In terms of Tibetan-medium recruitment, several further distinctions are 
worth highlighting. First, only 12.7 percent of all advertised positions in all 
Tibetan areas from 2011 to 2015 required any form of Tibetan language skills, 
or 13,551 advertisements out of a total of 106,948 (see figure 7). Accounting 
for Tibetan population shares, this gave a representativity ratio of 0.17. This 
ratio is quite low considering that minority language requirements are legally 
stipulated. 
Moreover, only about one-third (36 percent) of all Tibetan-medium 
positions mandated a Tibetan-medium college degree. Tibetans from the 
Chinese-medium education system would have been more likely to secure the 
remaining two-thirds of Tibetan-medium positions due to their superior 
Chinese language skills, as noted above. The low share of positions that were 
prioritized for Tibetan-medium degree holders reflects the specialized niche 
role of Tibetan minority education in China’s Tibetan regions. Indeed, the 
                                                
63 The Chinese names for security-related recruitment categories are fayuan xitong, sifa xitong, 
gong’an jiguan, renmin jingcha, teshu jingcha (or tejing), zhifa dadui etc. 
64 In 2014 alone, security related positions accounted for 58 percent of all civil service 
advertisements and 21 percent of all adverts for Tibetan areas outside the TAR. 
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number of advertised positions requiring a Chinese language degree – or 
closely related degrees such as secretarial studies (Ch. wenmi) – was only slightly 
lower than that of Tibetan-medium degrees. 
FIGURE 7 
 All advertised public recruitment in all Tibetan Regions, cumulative 2011-15 
 
 
However, these results were strongly differentiated by region. This is 
shown in figure 8, based on the population adjusted representativity ratio of 
Tibetan-medium jobs in the total advertisements for each region, and figure 9, 
based on the representativity ratios for cumulated job advertisements from 
2011-15 for each region and Tibetan-medium type. In the first case, the 
differentiation was especially marked in 2013 when there was a strong increase 
in bilingual jobs outside the TAR, in contrast to their continued marginalized 
role in the TAR since 2009, where 94 percent of all Tibetan-medium postings 
from 2011-15 required a Tibetan-medium degree. The other extreme was 
represented by Amdo Qinghai, where there was a strong surge in bilingual jobs 
but only 14 percent of these required Tibetan-medium degrees. The other 
regions fell in between these two extremes, although Ganzi fell sharply from 
the highest share of Tibetan-medium positions in 2009-10 and converged with 
the overall average and the share of Aba and Yushu by 2015. The trends in 
Gannan were more or less the same as in the TAR, including the decline of 
bilingual positions, versus a preserved niche role for a small number of 
Tibetan-medium degree positions. Overall, the average Tibetan-medium job 
share for all regions increased from 10 percent in 2011 to 14 percent in 2015 
(or from a ratio of 0.13 to 0.18).  
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FIGURE 8 
 Regional representativity ratios of all advertised Tibetan-medium 
 
 
In terms of the cumulated advertisements from 2011-15, as shown in 
figure 9, the regions can be roughly distinguished according three groups 
regarding total Tibetan-medium recruitment advertisements from 2011-15: 
Amdo Qinghai and Ganzi in the top group, Yushu and Aba in the middle, and 
Gannan and the TAR at the bottom. The regional differences were not nearly 
as pronounced for positions requiring Tibetan-medium degrees, although 
according to this measure, Gannan and the TAR also featured below-average 
shares. If measured per 100,000 population (not shown), these groupings 
would be the same in terms of Tibetan-medium advertisements, although in 
terms of Tibetan medium degree positions, the TAR actually advertised more 
per Tibetan capita than Amdo Qinghai given that it advertised significantly 
more overall jobs per capita than Amdo Qinghai between 2011-15, as shown 
above in figure 5. Indeed, as shown in table 3 above, the TAR emerged in 2014 
and 2015 as by far the largest provider of Tibetan medium degree jobs in 
nominal terms despite the very marginal role that these jobs played in overall 
public recruitment in the TAR.  
These regional differences and shifts over time reflect fundamentally 
different political attitudes towards the role of the Tibetan language in society 
and in the education system. All of the TAR’s bilingual positions in 2007 were 
for Tibetan-medium teachers in subjects other than the Tibetan language, and 
they made up 50 percent of all of that year’s total advertised teacher 
recruitment. At that time, the Tibetan language was therefore assigned a 
significant a role as a medium of educational instruction. However, the TAR 
did not advertise a single Tibetan-medium teaching job other than for Tibetan 
language instruction after 2009. In contrast, in Ganzi and especially in Amdo 
Qinghai, advertised bilingual teaching position have become more numerous 
than the ‘standard’ Tibetan language teaching jobs.  
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FIGURE 9 
 Representativity ratio of both types of advertised Tibetan-medium positions 
cumulated from 2011-15 
 
 
As a last note on Tibetan-medium positions, there was also variation 
between public employment categories. The teaching category occupied a 
dominant role, especially for Tibetan-medium degree postings, which is not 
surprising considering that Tibetan language teachers are required to hold a 
Tibetan-medium tertiary degree. For all regions, 3,027 out of the 4,857 
Tibetan-medium degree job postings from 2011-15 were in teaching (62 
percent), even though teaching positions made up only 25 percent of all 
advertised public jobs. In contrast, Tibetan-medium degree shares for the 
administratively more significant civil service were disproportionally low. This 
was especially drastic in the Qinghai TMAs, where a mere 11 of 1,072 Tibetan-
medium civil service job postings from 2011-15 specified such a degree 
requirement, while the large majority of Tibetan-medium degree postings were 
reserved for teaching positions (81 percent). As shown in figure 10, public 
service jobs were also underrepresented among all Tibetan-medium 
advertisement (23 percent of the subtotal), in contrast to their frequency for all 
advertisements (49 percent of the total), whereas the civil service was only 
underrepresented with respect to Tibetan medium degree positions specifically 
(13 percent of the subtotal), not with respect to general Tibetan medium 
positions (25 percent of the subtotal, versus 26 percent of the total). 
Even though the higher Tibetan-medium shares in teaching are 
understandable, the low shares in the other two sectors are problematic 
because these sectors are the loci where the political and even economic 
significance of the Tibetan language is ultimately decided. In this respect, it is 
also notable that Ganzi and Amdo Qinghai again stood out in terms of having 
relatively high shares of Tibetan medium positions in the civil and public 
service recruitment advertisements, as shown in figure 11, whereas the 
extremely low shares in the TAR stand out quite drastically. 
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FIGURE 10 
 Distribution of advertised recruitment public employment categories by Tibetan-
medium requirement (all regions, cumulative 2011-15) 
 
FIGURE 11 
 Representativity ratios of Tibetan-medium adverts, by region (cumulative 2011-15) 
 
 
However, the same cannot be said for the shares of Tibetan medium 
degree positions in the civil and public service recruitments, as shown in figure 
12. Nearly all regions besides Ganzi had extremely low percentages (the 
average ratio for all was 0.029, or 2.9 percent of what would be parity relative 
to the Tibetan population share). This is particularly problematic for Tibetan-
medium graduates, whose choice of Tibetan education system is already high 
risk due to narrow options (i.e. virtually no stable and adequately remunerated 
private sector options). Amdo Qinghai in particular is a region that produces a 
large amount of Tibetan-medium tertiary graduates, yet it advertised a share of 
Tibetan medium degree positions outside of teaching that was second-lowest, 
only 0.1 percentage point higher than the TAR’s paltry 1.7 percent. 
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FIGURE 12 
 Representativity ratio of advertised civil and public service positions with Tibetan-
medium degree requirements (cumulative 2011-15) 
 
5 Recruitment Advertisements: Preferentiality by 
Residency Requirements 
As noted in section three, another important factor providing preferentiality in 
the recruitments, and that partly helps to explain the much higher share of 
Tibetans hired than would be suggested in the Tibetan-medium requirements 
in the recruitment advertisements, is the specification of local residency 
requirements. Residency requirements restrict local public job allocation to 
local residents, of the entire province, of the prefecture where the position is 
advertised, or even of the county.65 In prefectures with a majority Tibetan 
population, prefecture or county-level restrictions are significant. The fiercest 
competition for desirable government jobs often comes from well-educated 
Han (or possibly minorities) from regions with stronger educational bases, 
such as provincial capitals or their surrounding areas.66 In these cases, 
prefecture residency restrictions offer significant potential to increase the share 
of positions allocated to disadvantaged local minorities such as Tibetans. More 
recently, residency requirements are often not just limited to those who hold a 
current residency from the region (Ch. huji), but also include those who 
‘originated from’ (i.e. were born in) the region (Ch. shengyuandi). As with all 
aspects of recruitment, residency requirements in Tibetan prefectures can 
potentially be circumvented by bribing the relevant officials, including by Han 
applicants from outside the locality (e.g. see Zenz, 2013:184). As noted before, 
the central government’s general crackdown on corruption may have improved 
enforcement of regular procedures in this respect. 
5.1 Post-fenpei residency requirements in the TAR 
The TAR stands out as a notable exception in terms of residency requirements, 
to the extent that these appear to have more or less supplanted the language 
requirements, as discussed above. The case therefore deserves more attention, 
                                                
65 County-level residency requirements occurred only in Yushu and Gannan, but in these two 
regions, there were quite common. 
66 See Fischer (2009; 2014, chapter 6); Zenz (2013, chapter 5). 
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which is also possible given that the case is fairly well documented in various 
government reports or Chinese public media. The TAR has featured a 
comprehensive residency requirement since at least the availability of TAR 
public recruitment advertisements in 2007. This specifies that all types of 
advertised TAR government positions are restricted to graduates who took 
their university entrance exam (gaokao) in the TAR and were TAR residents at 
that time. The requirement therefore potentially excludes local residents who 
had studied outside the TAR (as well as non-residents). This is clearly stated in 
every single TAR recruitment advertisement document and is referred to as 
‘origin’ (生源 shengyuan). Contrary to residency, origin can never be changed 
but is determined by a fixed prior condition, which in this case is defined with 
reference to the gaokao. This blanket shengyuan requirement is well known to 
applicants and is discussed, for instance, on online forums, where those 
replying to questions about TAR jobs affirm this fact. There was even an 
official news article in June 2015 reminding secondary graduates from the TAR 
who were about to take the gaokao that they must choose a TAR gaokao 
location, otherwise even a TAR resident can forfeit their right to compete for 
TAR public employment later on.67 Given that shengyuan for this purpose is not 
defined as original place of birth, one could presumably move to the TAR 
during secondary education (such as the child of a cadre), change residency and 
take the gaokao there, study college anywhere else in China, and then return to 
apply for TAR public employment. However, considering the generally inferior 
state of secondary education in the TAR, this would not be the obvious choice 
for those who would be able to navigate such a scenario.  
This exceptional blanket shengyuan requirement in the TAR since at least 
2007 appears to have served as the maintenance of a form of preferentiality (or 
local protectionism) in public employment following the phasing out of fenpei. 
We do not have information as to whether this restriction also applied in the 
TAR under the fenpei system; we also do not know to what extent it applies to 
state-sector employment more generally, although we can presume that it does 
not apply to the bulk of recruitment in SOEs. Whether or not the local 
recruitments cover all public employment in the TAR is also an important 
question. For example, it might be the case that a significant portion of public 
sector employment in the TAR, particularly at more senior cadre levels, is filled 
not by local recruitments but by transfers from other parts of China, as is often 
reported and regularly observed in the TAR. It is also not clear to what extent 
recently migrated Han Chinese or other non-Tibetans can qualify for local 
residency in order to apply for such positions, particularly given the very low 
rates of tertiary level graduates in the permanently resident (mostly Tibetan) 
working age population (see Fischer 2014: 261). Other strategies might be used 
to override the requirement such as corruption, which is generally rampant in 
these public employment processes, as mentioned earlier. Notably, unlike other 
Tibetan areas such as Ganzi or parts of Qinghai, the TAR is much less 
transparent about actual recruitment outcomes.  
                                                
67 Wang Dong. 2015. 给考生提个醒：你是“西藏生源”吗？(gei kaosheng ti ge xing: ni 
shi “xizang shengyuan” ma?, tr. Giving exam takers a reminder: are you of ‘TAR origin’?), June 
16, http://www.tibet.cn/news/index/xzyw/201506/t20150616_3232414.htm 
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Nonetheless, this shengyuan requirement in the TAR is a significant insight 
that, to a certain extent, contradicts much of the standard perception that non-
local Han Chinese are dominating and squeezing out local Tibetans from such 
job opportunities (indeed, as was argued by Fischer 2005, albeit based on data 
from the early 2000s that indicated that this was the case, as discussed above). 
The restriction would have reserved at least a substantial share of local public 
employment for local residents, although the shortfall of recruitments 
compared to graduates from 2007 to 2010, as discussed in the first section with 
reference to figure 4, meant that it did not yet function as a job guarantee given 
the surplus of graduates. It is only from 2011 onwards that the TAR 
government appears to have innovated a sort of neo-fenpei job guarantee for 
local graduates through its explicit guarantee to employ local graduates, as 
discussed in the introduction. As mentioned above, the fact that the local 
government posted more recruitments than local graduates in 2012 indicates 
that it was probably trying to provide jobs for graduates from previous years 
who did not manage to secure jobs in previous recruitment rounds (anyone 
meeting the requirements and who had graduated since 2006, i.e. since the 
ending of fenpei, could apply to these jobs, so graduates in one year would also 
have to compete with reapplying graduates from previous years). However, as 
also discussed in the first section, increasing shortfalls between numbers of 
TAR resident graduates and job advertisements suggest that maintaining this 
full guarantee will soon require again higher levels of public sector employment 
or else other strategies of formal employment generation. 
5.2 Residency requirements from the recruitment 
advertisement data 
With this clarification of the TAR in mind, a brief summary of the residency 
requirements indicated in the recruitment advertisement documents is shown 
in table 4. The data only show prefecture-level residency requirements that 
require applicants either to hold current residency or to have originated from 
the prefecture. Provincial residency requirements, which are very common and 
are not sufficient to protect Tibetans from non-Tibetan competition in the 
Tibetan areas outside of the TAR, were not taken into account. Moreover, 
positions with residency restrictions are at times also open to those who have 
served in one of the voluntary government service programs in the respective 
prefecture. These positions were likewise not counted as because they do not 
sufficiently restrict application to genuine locals, and may lead to significant 
competition from outsiders, who are often more highly-educated Han. 
It is also important to note that residency requirements were often linked 
to Tibetan-medium positions. By restricting a high proportion (typically about 
60-100 percent) of Tibetan-medium positions to local applicants, Tibetan-
medium competitors from other regions are excluded. This type of 
protectionism protects graduates from regions with weaker Tibetan-medium 
education. However, it also prevents the cross-regional transfer of highly 
skilled Tibetan labour forces across Tibetan regions, which is especially 
problematic for regions with high numbers of Tibetan-medium degree 
graduates yet low related advert figures, such as Amdo Qinghai.  
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TABLE 4 
 Residency requirements for prefecture and lower levels in the recruitment 
advertisements as shares of all job postings 
Region	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2011-15	average	
Amdo	Qinghai	 n/a	 27%	 17%	 51%	 33%	 39%	 37%	
Yushu	 n/a	 45%	 44%	 60%	 30%	 40%	 43%	
Aba	 58%	 42%	 41%	 25%	 54%	 46%	 51%	
Ganzi	 34%	 18%	 25%	 41%	 46%	 23%	 37%	
Gannan	 76%	 85%	 88%	 91%	 91%	 46%	 85%	
TAR	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	
All		 n/a	 86%	 80%	 82%	 82%	 69%	 79%	
All	(excl.	TAR)	 n/a	 53%	 41%	 56%	 55%	 35%	 48%		
Indeed, cross-regional employment has been a common phenomenon. 
For instance, quite a few of Qinghai’s Tibetan-medium tertiary graduates had 
been able to obtain related positions in the Sichuan TMAs, among them some 
of the fieldwork informants of both authors. This can also be observed in 
Ganzi’s 2012 tegang teacher recruitment, which did not carry any local 
residency requirements, and in which 13.1 percent of all recruitees were from 
Qinghai, who filled only 3.4 percent of the Chinese-medium teaching 
positions, but 47.1 percent of the Tibetan-medium positions.  
However, residency requirements are by no means restricted to Tibetan-
medium job postings. Table 4 shows that different regions have imposed them 
to varying extents. For all regions apart from the TAR, 48 percent of all job 
postings carried residency requirements (2011-15), meaning that just over half 
of all job postings outside the TAR were open to wider competition. The 
reason for the fairly inconsistent fluctuations within regions over time is due to 
the fact that these requirements are often attached to particular job types. For 
example, Aba and Ganzi feature a blanket residency requirement for all 
primary-level teaching positions, but none for secondary teaching jobs. 
Therefore, the share of teaching positions with residency requirements varied 
according to the frequency of recruitments across these various job categories. 
Similarly, health-related public service positions typically do not carry residency 
requirements, whereas county-level positions mostly do. Hence, residency 
requirement shares fluctuate along with variations in these job types. This 
explains, for example, Ganzi’s low 2015 residency requirement share, while the 
lower 2015 average share for all regions was also strongly impacted by the fact 
that Gannan advertised no public service jobs for that year.  
Even so, we can discern basic policy changes in several regions starting in 
2012. In that year, Amdo Qinghai introduced residency requirements for its 
public service positions for the first time (but already had them for teaching 
and civil service jobs), while Aba and Ganzi started them for civil service jobs 
for the first time (but already had them for teaching and public service. 
Gannan did not impose higher shares of civil service residency restrictions 
until 2013. Given that civil service positions are targeted at higher-skilled 
applicants and carry more responsibilities, they have typically been open to 
applicants from entire provinces, or even from the whole country. A common 
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limitation for civil service job postings prior to 2012 was that applicants with 
an inferior associate degree had to be from the prefecture, whereas those with 
a BA degree or higher could be from anywhere in the nation. However, by 
2014-15, nearly half of all civil service positions outside of the TAR carried 
prefecture-level restrictions (48 percent in 2014 and 41 percent in 2015, 
compared to only 7 percent in 2011; see figure 11). In particular, the Sichuan 
TMA’s residency requirement shares for this employment category rose from 7 
percent in 2011 to 52 percent in 2014. The increase, if applied, would have 
substantially inhibited Han competition from other regions of Sichuan. 
Rising shares are a sign that minority-dominated prefecture governments 
are increasingly able (or at least willing) to meet their human resource needs 
with locals. This is likely motivated in the interests of serving and/or appeasing 
their own constituencies at a time when graduate employment has become an 
increasingly sensitive political issue. It is a reflection of improved educational 
levels in Tibetan regions, both with regard to regular as well as Tibetan-
medium education. For example, the increased residency requirements for 
Sichuan’s TMAs, especially for Tibetan-medium jobs from 2012 onwards, must 
be understood in light of the fact that Sichuan’s reported intake of new 
Tibetan-medium tertiary students more than doubled, from about 350 in 2010 
to nearly 790 in 2015. However, figure 12 also indicates that the use of 
residency as a protectionist measure has not been consistent over time. 
FIGURE 13 
 Residency requirement shares, all regions excl. TAR, by public employment category 
 
 
Recruitment outcome documents that list the residency of applicants are 
rare. Ganzi’s 2011 civil service list of interview candidates is one rare example. 
This intake only required applicants with an inferior associate degree to hold 
Ganzi residency, and otherwise applicants from the whole country were 
permitted. Of all interview candidates, 82 percent were Ganzi residents. Only 
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46 percent of Han applicants were prefecture residents, in contrast to 93 
percent of Tibetan and 100 percent of other minority applicants.68  
TABLE 5 
 Share of Tibetans (or ethnic minorities) hired (or interviewed) for positions without 
Tibetan-medium requirements, by residency requirement, from four outcome samples 
Region	/	intake	 Local	residency		requirement	
No	local	residency	
requirement	
Ganzi	2012	civil	service	(2nd	intake,	Tibetans,	re-
cruited)	 76%	 40%	
Ganzi	2015	public	service	(health	sector,	Tibetans,	
interview	candidates)	 82%	 53%	
Hainan	and	Huangnan	2015	public	service	teachers	
(select	minorities,69	interview	candidates)	 86%	 60%	
Huangnan	2015	public	service	(select	minorities,70	
interview	candidates)	 84%	 53%	
 
The actual impact of local residency requirements can be at least 
tentatively gleaned from the public recruitment outcome documents examined 
in table 5. This table is based on only those positions that did not require any 
Tibetan-medium requirements, so as to isolate the preferential effect of 
residency requirements in the absence of overlapping language requirements. 
Even though these few examples cannot be taken to be representative, they 
confirm that local residency requirements serve to reduce competition from 
more highly educated outsiders, potentially leading to higher recruitment shares 
for Tibetans in positions that do not carry any other preferentiality attributes 
such as Tibetan language or degree requirements. 
The results from these four examples are in fact quite similar to the 
outcomes by language requirement. In the sample of 21 outcome documents 
analysed previously, the Tibetan or minority recruitment (or interview 
candidate) share for positions without any language or degree requirements 
stood at 58 percent, whereas the same recruitment share for bilingual positions 
amounted to 84 percent. Table 5 indicates a comparable effect for 
preferentiality by residency requirement and in the absence of language 
requirement. However, the relatively high overlap of both types of 
preferentiality reduces the impact of local residency stipulations in promoting 
Tibetans representation. Additionally, the residency requirements erect barriers 
for the cross-regional transfer of Tibetan-medium job applicants, which can 
ultimately be quite problematic for regions with high numbers of Tibetan-
                                                
68 All Han interview candidates were from Sichuan, whereas 4 percent of the Tibetans were 
from outside of the province (mostly from Qinghai).  
69 Ethnic minorities were identified by an added five points in the data tables. Interview 
candidates with the Chinese last name "Ma" (马) were categorised separately since these 
candidates are almost certainly not Tibetans but rather from a Muslim ethnic group such as the 
Hui or Salar. For all ethnic minorities, the shares are 92% (local residency requirement) versus 
71 percent (no local residency requirement). 
70 Ethnic minorities were identified by an added five points in the data tables. Interview 
candidates with the Chinese last name "Ma" (马) were categorised separately since these 
candidates are almost certainly not Tibetans but rather from a Muslim ethnic group such as the 
Hui or Salar. For all ethnic minorities, the shares are 92% (local residency requirement) versus 
71 percent (no local residency requirement). 
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medium graduates (such as Amdo Qinghai). If the regional distribution of 
public Tibetan-medium degree positions continues to be highly divergent, 
residency requirements will likely serve to further disadvantage this already 
vulnerable group of employment seekers. 
6 Conclusion 
Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing the available data on 
public employment recruitment advertisements and outcomes in the Tibetan 
areas of China. Most importantly, despite almost a decade of ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the public employment systems of the Tibetan areas due to 
retrenchment and the ending of fenpei, Tibetan representation within public 
recruitment did not collapse. Rather, in tandem with strong increases in overall 
public employment, particularly from 2011 onwards, Tibetans appear to have 
been significantly underrepresented in new recruitments across all Tibetan 
areas in China from 2007 to 2015, without any significant regional or 
temporary patterns. The underrepresentation, at an average of about 83 
percent of what would be parity with their population share, is significant 
enough to result in a chronic erosion of representation overtime and also does 
not address historical underrepresentation. However, more information is also 
needed on the ethnic composition of people exiting from public employment, 
such as through retirements or transfers to other provinces, in order to have a 
more holistic evaluation of the evolution of Tibetan representation. For 
instance, transfers out of the province are likely to be disproportionately non-
Tibetan and hence compensating for the underrepresentation in recruitments. 
Moreover, following the surge in public employment, particularly in the 
TAR and the Tibetan majority areas (TMAs) of Qinghai, new recruitment has 
employed a much larger share of the university-aged population than during 
the late job assignment period, thereby reasserting the role of the state as 
predominant employment provider for educated Tibetan millennials, after a 
period in which this role appeared to be waning under the force of 
retrenchment and marketising reforms. Indeed, the slump in recruitments in 
2007 preceded the outbreak of large-scale protests in the TAR and other 
Tibetan areas in 2008. Of course we must be careful in drawing direct causal 
links between the very austere employment conditions facing graduates during 
these transitional years and the protests given the lack of precise information 
on the identity of the protesters, e.g. whether they significantly included recent 
graduates or not.  
Practices of preferentiality appear to significantly bolster representation, 
although such practices do exhibit distinct temporal and regional variations. 
According to the recruitment data we have been able to analyse, language or 
Tibetan-medium degree type requirements in the TAR and in Gannan TAP in 
Gansu became very marginal (besides in 2007 due to what appears to have 
been a surge in teacher recruitments). This reflects a very specialised niche role 
in the use of such specifications. The same requirements played a large role in 
Ganzi TAP in Sichuan, although this role diminished up to 2015, whereas their 
use in the Amdo region of Qinghai increased over this period. The trends in 
Yushu and Aba are unclear (Dechen/Deqin TAP in Yunnan was not analysed). 
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Overall, these linguistic specifications appear to have been largely in bilingual 
rather than Tibetan-medium degree requirements, and also concentrated in 
teaching positions, although this depends on the region and year. While the 
predominance of bilingual over degree-related job requirements is inadequate 
for addressing the urgent employment needs of graduates from the burgeoning 
Tibetan-medium education system, bilingual requirements nonetheless appear 
to have the potential to substantially increase the share of recruited Tibetans.  
In contrast, the use of residency requirements across all Tibetan regions 
has emerged as a significant and relatively stable (although not uniformly 
dominant) form of practicing preferentiality or protecting jobs for locals in 
public employment. The limited available evidence indicates that this form of 
preferentiality likewise may bolster the recruitment of (local) Tibetans by 
restricting non-local competition, although this can also exclude Tibetans from 
other Tibetan areas.  
In the TAR, the transition from a fenpei system to a system of local 
residency requirements appears to have been seamless and total, given that all 
public sector recruitments from 2007 onwards have specified local ‘origin’ (Ch. 
shengyuan) as a form of residency, and then the government re-introduced 
employment guarantees for graduates with such shengyuan in 2011. The actual 
impact of this particular form of preferentiality in the TAR cannot be assessed 
given that outcome documents for this province after 2009 do not provide the 
ethnicity of applicants or recruitees. However, it is likely that the 2011 
employment guarantees would have had a strong effect on at least maintaining 
the level of representation at previous levels (depending, of course, on the 
Tibetan share of TAR graduates from anywhere in China with shengyuan).  
It is in this sense that we have coined the term neo-fenpei to characterise 
the emerging system of employing local graduates in the public sector. The 
system has the same effect of guaranteeing employment for such graduates, 
but within a radically different and new context in which such public sector 
employment only accounts for a minority of total urban employment, whereas 
it would have dominated urban employment during the fenpei period. Hence, 
whereas fenpei would have been an equalizing force within the urban areas 
(although not across urban and rural areas) – also by extending social 
provisioning associated with formal employment to the families of those 
employed – the neo-fenpei system has become a strong source of segmentation 
and differentiation within the emerging urban employment system, in 
particular by accentuating university education as a gateway to privilege. Given 
the much lower schooling attainments in rural areas, this would presumably 
have the effect of also maintaining the strong institutional segmentation and 
inequality between urban and rural areas that were characteristic of the earlier 
fenpei system, except through less explicit mechanisms, particularly if and when 
the hukou (household residency) system comes to be fully abolished.  
Outside the TAR, a notable policy change can be discerned in several 
regions in the form of introducing or increasing local residency requirements 
for public service and/or civil service jobs (as opposed to teaching jobs, where 
this was more common). As a result, nearly half of all civil service positions 
outside of the TAR carried prefecture-level restrictions by 2014-15, compared 
to only 7 percent in 2011. The increase, if applied, would have substantially 
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inhibited Han competition from other regions. The fact that civil service 
positions often had (and at times still have) no restriction at all, meaning that 
anyone from China could apply, makes the residency requirements especially 
pertinent in this more privileged and power-laden job category. 
The generalised decline in the use of language and Tibetan-medium degree 
requirements suggests the continuation and entrenchment of assimilationist 
trends in education and employment policies, and a lack of priority for Tibetan 
medium education more generally (with the exception of the Amdo region in 
Qinghai). The sharp decline in Tibetan-medium requirements in Ganzi was 
particularly exceptional, especially in light of the exceptionally high share of 
recruitments with such requirements in 2009 and 2010. Overall, the decline in 
language or Tibetan-medium degree requirements, particularly outside of 
teaching, that occurred parallel to the recruitment surge (in some regions) 
suggests a continuing if not increasing irrelevance of the minority language 
stipulations contained in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.  
The expansion of residency requirements, particularly in the important 
civil service sector, alternatively suggests a new movement of local level 
protectionism in public employment, probably led by local governments. This 
new development holds both promise as well as complications, the latter in 
relation to the labour mobility of university educated Tibetans across the 
Tibetan areas in China. Indeed, this new policy approach was previously 
constrained by the shortage of educated Tibetan labour in remote Tibetan 
areas, whereas it has been permitted and facilitated by the glut of qualified 
Tibetan candidates by the late 2000s across all Tibetan areas, as a result of the 
education campaigns started in the 1990s (with respect to primary and 
secondary schooling), which in turn allowed for a surge of university intakes in 
the 2000s.  
The strong increases in advertised public recruitment from 2011 onward 
in nearly all regions likely reflect a recognition on the part of the government 
that secure and well-remunerated (i.e. corporate) private employment in 
China’s west remains starkly inadequate, as discussed in the first section, and 
that Tibetans are severely disadvantaged in competing for the little that is 
available. It probably also reflects the government’s perception that an 
adequate supply of appropriate employment for minority graduates in is central 
to securing social stability in these potentially restive regions. This is also 
suggested by the fact that the state has used the recruitment drive to bolster the 
ranks of its security apparatus, especially in the TAR and the Qinghai TMAs. 
However, even despite the TAR’s revived ‘full employment’ guarantee for its 
graduates since 2011, total recruitments from 2007-15 fell short of the number 
of graduates over the same period by about 7-8,000 jobs. Given stabilising 
numbers of recruitments versus rising numbers of graduates, a shortfall already 
appeared in 2015 and is likely to progressively worsen in the near future, 
assuming current trends (which, as we have come to know with respect to 
China, is never a wise thing to assume). With recruitments and state-sector 
wages at already relatively high levels, it is clear that continuing such a state-
dominated employment policy in the TAR will become increasingly costly for 
the state. The same applies to Tibetan areas outside the TAR, particularly 
considering their greater reliance on more expensive civil service positions, and 
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where lower state-sector salaries are counterbalanced by more austere local 
government financial circumstances. 
Finally, this paper also demonstrates the significance of these public 
recruitment data (both adverts and outcomes) for enabling detailed meso-level 
analyses that connect micro-level insights to macroeconomic trends in the 
official employment data. They offer a potential for insights into a range of 
practices and outcomes regarding the recruitment outcomes of potentially 
disenfranchised minorities, linguistic promotion in public employment, 
evolving practices of local government employment protectionism, graduate 
employment circumstances, and so forth. This study focuses on the Tibetan 
case, in which the issue of public sector recruitment of graduates is especially 
salient, particularly in light of significant advancements in Tibetan minority 
education, and the findings give cause to a range of concerns. Indeed, given the 
vast scope of the Tibetan areas in China and the political complications of 
gaining permission for comprehensive local research, this new data source 
offers a very precious insight into these issues and presents a trove of data for 
further research. Nonetheless, these new data sources are equally pertinent to 
other parts of China, for research on similar issues and for similar types of 
analysis in non-Tibetan areas, provided of course that analyses are conducted 
on the basis of robust understanding of the local contexts to which the data 
refer.  
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
Graduate student reports of China’s tertiary institutions: 
 
2014 reports: 
http://www.ncss.org.cn/tbch/2014jqggxbysjyzlndbg/index.shtml 
 
2013 reports: 
Qinghai Normal University: http://www.qhnu.edu.cn/tongzhigonggao/2014-
12-03/2300.html  
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Qinghai University for Nationalities: 
http://219.247.255.26/index.php?c=content&a=show&id=171  
 
Tertiary graduate and new student figures by province were the provincial re-
ports on economic and social development (guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji 
gongbao): 
Qinghai: http://xxgk.qh.gov.cn/html/663/List.html 
Sichuan: http://www.sc.stats.gov.cn/sjfb/tjgb/ 
TAR: http://www.tjcn.org/help/3571.html 
Gansu: http://www.gstj.gov.cn/www/HdClsContentMain.asp?ClassId=8  
 
 
Public recruitment adverts: (Note all links accessed between 4 May 2015 and 15 
April 2016) 
 
Teshe gangwei teacher recruitment: 
 
Qinghai (Amdo Qinghai and Yushu TAP): 
2010: http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/7461.html  
2011: http://www.jingjia.org/2011/0527/article_2041.html,  
2012: http://www.qhedu.cn/zwgk/tzgg/201206/t20120620_8101.html, 
http://www.5haoxue.net/jiaoshi/zixun/20120621/15804.html  
2013: http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content471.html  
2014: http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content937.html  
2015: http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content1819.html  
 
Gansu: 
2010: 
http://www.gsedu.cn/redzt/tegjsjhzt/tongzgg/2010/05/19/1274256273862.
html  
2011: 
http://www.gsedu.gov.cn/UploadFile/2011/05/20110531093135994.xls  
2012: http://tg.ncss.org.cn/news/Services/AttachDownLoad.jsp?id=269057  
2013: 
http://www.gsedu.gov.cn/UploadFile/2013/05/20130522091419468.xls  
2014: http://tg.ncss.org.cn/news/Services/AttachDownLoad.jsp?id=283909  
2015: http://tg.ncss.org.cn/gdgg/gs/289018.shtml  
 
Sichuan: 
2010: http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2010scszpgwjsgwszylbfj1.xls 
2011: 
http://imgs.sc.gov.cn/DocAnnex/2011/4/26/5b48f5c787344f6eba98c0b75
5b31a32.doc  
2012: http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201359/201359164916_n_10921.html 
2013: http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201359/201359164916_n_10921.html 
2014: http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014428/2014428142327_n_12094.html  
2015: http://tg.ncss.org.cn/tgdt/288785.shtml  
 
 
Public Service Teacher Recruitment: 
 
Amdo Qinghai: 
 
2010: Hainan TAP http://www.qhhn.gov.cn/html/2324/198757.html  
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2011: Haibei TAP 
http://www.12edu.com/gwy/ssxx/qh/201106/636570.shtml,  
Hainan TAP http://www.amdotibet.com/html/2011-07/13500.html,  
Golog TAP http://www.studyez.com/news/201107/12/67659.htm  
 
2012: Haibei TAP http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content314.html,  
Hainan TAP http://www.qhrc.com.cn/news/20120817/1208170004.shtml 
and http://www.qhrc.com.cn/news/20120817/1208170005.shtml,  
Huangnan TAP http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content320.html,  
Golog TAP http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content344.html  
 
2013: all regions http://www.qhhrss.gov.cn/html/4583/267726.html  
 
2014: all regions http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content1189.html  
 
2015: all regions http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content1493.html and 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content1809.html  
 
Yushu TAP: 
 
2011: http://www.yushunews.com/system/2014/04/13/011360437.shtml 
and http://www.zhaojiao123.com/html/qinghai/20150327/1314.html   
 
2012: http://www.qhpta.com/file/zwb.xls (see also 
http://www.qhrc.com.cn/news/20120604/1206040002.shtml) 
 
2013-15: see Amdo Qinghai 
 
Gannan TAP: see ‘Public Service Recruitment’ 
 
Aba TAP: 
 
2010: http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwgn/29.jhtml (document no longer availa-
ble, but available at 
http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2010absydwgzgzrygwxqxxbfj1.xls) 
 
2011: http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011810/2011810142417_n_7806.html  
 
2012: http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwgn/765.jhtml  
 
2013: regular intake http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/1482.jhtml, supplemen-
tary intake of teachers needed for certain subjects (jinque xueke jiaoshi) 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/1210.jhtml  
 
2014: regular intake 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/u/cms/www/201406/28113827c10m.xls, supple-
mentary intake of teachers needed for certain subjects (jinque xueke jiaoshi) 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggl/gzgx/201406/W020140625370335046671.x
ls  
 
2015: http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog142/2192.jhtml, supplementary intake 
of teachers needed for certain subjects (jinque xueke jiaoshi) at 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog142/2236.jhtml  
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Ganzi TAP: 
 
2010: http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010519/2010519102010_n_5691.html  
 
2011: http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2011gzgzwssydwjsrymebfj3.doc  
 
2012: http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2012gzgzjsmefpbfj1.doc and 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/Admin/news/fileTmp/921_%E9%99%84%E4%
BB%B61.doc  
 
2013: 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/Admin/news/fileTmp/%E7%94%98%E5%AD
%9C%E5%B7%9E2013%E5%B9%B4%E5%85%AC%E5%BC%80%E8%8
0%83%E8%AF%95%E8%81%98%E7%94%A8%E4%B8%AD%E5%B0%
8F%E5%AD%A6%E3%80%81%E5%B9%BC%E5%84%BF%E5%9B%A
D%E6%95%99%E5%B8%88%E5%90%8D%E9%A2%9D%E5%88%86%
E9%85%8D%E8%A1%A8.doc (or 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/Admin/news/fileTmp/⽢孜州2013年公开考试
聘⽤中⼩学、幼⼉园教师名额分配表.doc) 
 
2014: Multiple links at http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/213112.html 
(compare http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201464/201464150659_n_12202.html), 
supplementary intake at http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/202991.html   
 
2015: http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1674, supplementary 
intake at http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1686  
 
Public Service Recruitment: (note primary and secondary school teacher recruitments 
are not included in these documents except for Gannan TAP). 
 
Amdo Qinghai: 
 
2011: Haibei TAP 
http://www.12edu.com/gwy/ssxx/qh/201106/636570.shtml, Hainan TAP 
http://sydw.offcn.com/2011/0726/10586.html,  township and village health 
centers and community health centers (xiangzhen weishengyuan shequ 
weisheng fuwu zhongxin) 
http://www.qhhrss.gov.cn/images/2011071810484655.xls (compare 
http://www.qhhrss.gov.cn/html/4786/242504.html), township and village 
health centers (xiangzhen weishengyuan) 
http://qh.offcn.com/dl/2011/0922/20110922090359613.xls 
 
2012: Hainan TAP http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content216.html, 
Huangan TAP http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content319.html, Haixi TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content306.html, Golog TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content209.html, township and village 
health centers and community health centers (xiangcun weishengyuan shequ 
weisheng fuwu zhongxin) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content224.html, grassroots health institu-
tions (jiceng yiliao weisheng jigou) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content308.html 
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2013: Huangnan TAP http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content518.html, 
Hainan TAP http://www.qh.xinhuanet.com/ghx/2013-
10/31/c_117952020.htm, Haibei TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content780.html, Golog TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content431.html, health sector (county level 
public hospitals) http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content493.html and 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content803.html 
 
2014: provincial level http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content928.html, 
health sector (county level) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1113.html, grassroots health insti-
tutions (jiceng yiliao weisheng jigou) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1114.html, Hainan TAP 
http://www.qhhn.gov.cn/html/2324/411499.html, Huangnan TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content1228.html, Haixi TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1297.html, Haibei TAP 
http://www.qhhb.gov.cn/images/2014120417291173.xls  
 
2015: provincial level http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1749.html, 
health sector (grassroots health institutions and county level) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content1814.html, Golog TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content2080.html, Haixi MTAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content2075.html, Huangnan TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content2137.html, Hainan TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content2224.html, Yushu TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content2237.html, Haibei TAP 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/%E6%B5%B7%E5%8C%97%E5%B7%9
E2015%E5%B9%B4%E4%BA%8B%E4%B8%9A%E5%8D%95%E4%BD
%8D%E4%BA%BA%E5%91%98%E6%8B%9B%E8%81%98%E8%AE%
A1%E5%88%92%E8%A1%A8.htm  
 
Yushu TAP: 
 
2011: prefecture and county levels 
http://www.qhnews.com/yushuzhou/system/2011/06/03/010380610.shtml 
(no longer available, but available at http://www.doc88.com/p-
3817901204954.html),  township and village health centers and community 
health centers (xiangzhen weishengyuan shequ weisheng fuwu zhongxin) 
http://www.qhhrss.gov.cn/images/2011071810484655.xls (compare 
http://www.qhhrss.gov.cn/html/4786/242504.html), township and village 
health centers (xiangzhen weishengyuan) 
http://qh.offcn.com/dl/2011/0922/20110922090359613.xls 
 
2012: township and village health centers and community health centers 
(xiangcun weishengyuan shequ weisheng fuwu zhongxin) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content224.html, grassroots health institu-
tions (jiceng yiliao weisheng jigou) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content308.html, Yushu health system 
(Yushuzhou weisheng xitong) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content296.html, Yushu county and munic-
ipal management centers (Yushu xianshizheng guanli zhongxin) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content296.html   
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2013: prefecture, county and township levels 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content461.html, health sector (county level 
public hospitals) http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content493.html and 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/8/Content803.html 
 
2014: prefecture level http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1324.html, 
provincial level http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content928.html, health 
sector (county level) http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1113.html, 
grassroots health institutions (jiceng yiliao weisheng jigou) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content1114.html  
 
2015: see Amdo Qinghai 
 
Gannan TAP: 
 
2010: 
http://edu.newdu.com/Institution/Inf/Notice/201008/194888_4.html  
 
2011: http://gwy.china-b.com/gansu/gannan/zhaokao/38437.html and 
http://www.doc88.com/p-1466543733968.html  
 
2012: 
http://gn.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2012/09/24/012946238_01.shtml and 
http://www.gshzgwyw.com/shiyedanwei/zhaokaozixun/20121001/1403.ht
ml (formerly accessible at 
http://www.zqxws.gov.cn/wMcms_ShowArticle.asp?WMCMS_ArticleID=4
65)  
 
2013: http://www.gn.gansu.gov.cn/html/2013/gggs_1029/1299.html and 
http://www.ynpxrz.com/n462810c1658.aspx  
 
2014: http://www.gn.gansu.gov.cn/html/2014/zkzl_1030/2106.html  
 
2015: no intake 
 
Aba TAP: 
 
2010: health sector and general intake 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwgn/29.jhtml (document no longer available, but 
available at 
http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2010absydwgzgzrygwxqxxbfj1.xls) 
 
2011: health sector and general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011810/2011810142417_n_7806.html,  
 
2012: health sector and general intake (first intake) 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwgn/765.jhtml, health sector and general intake 
(second intake) 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/u/cms/www/201212/Upload/2012092112371881
5.xls and 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/u/cms/www/201212/Upload/2012092112365265
4.xls, public road workers 
http://www.chinagwy.org/files/20121011090936_63731.xls   
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2013: health sector and general intake (first intake)  
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog142/1344.jhtml, health sector and general in-
take (second intake) http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/1482.jhtml, health sec-
tor supplementary intake (jinque weisheng rencai) 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/u/cms/www/201304/12165222oqnu.xls, general 
intake supplementary recruitment (jinque zhuanye jishu renyuan) 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/1211.jhtml  
 
2014: health sector and general intake (first intake) 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/1884.jhtml, health sector, general intake, 
public road workers, Huanglong management office fire fighters (all second 
intake) http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/2011.jhtml, health sector supple-
mentary intake (jinque weisheng rencai) 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggl/gzgx/201406/W020140625370335046297.x
ls, general intake supplementary recruitment (jinque zhuanye jishu renyuan) 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggl/gzgx/201406/W020140625370335042502.x
ls  
 
2015: health sector and general intake 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog142/2585.jhtml, supplementary intake 
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog142/2236.jhtml   
 
Ganzi TAP:  
 
Note: Listings for many of the more recent Ganzi public service jobs at 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/city/zhiweibiao-ganzi-1.html (subsequent pages). 
 
2009: health sector 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009527/2009527173609_n_4142.html and 
http://www.qwrsrc.gov.cn/Article/ShowInfo.asp?InfoID=222 (compare 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/UploadFile/NewFile/2009116113619278.doc, 
document no longer available online on either site, but can be obtained from 
Adrian Zenz), birth control stations 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009819/2009819142000_n_4544.html, county and 
township levels 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009119/200911993656_n_4801.html, public road 
workers http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009819/2009819135525_n_4543.html  
 
2010: county and township levels 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010115/2010115111230_n_6436.html, prefecture 
level 
http://113.54.11.227/showarticle.php?actiontype=5&id=210&keyword_type
=&search_keyword=, grassroots health units 
http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2010gzgzwssydwjsrymefpbfj1.doc, public 
road workers 
http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2010ngzzgljgzgwmebfj1.doc  
 
2011: grassroots health units 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/20111124/20111124151344_n_8293.html, county, 
township and prefecture level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/38499.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/37439.html 
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2012: health sector 
http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2012gzzgkkspyjcwssydwzyjsrymefpbfj1.d
oc, prefecture and county level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/97823.html, birth control staff (jihua 
shengyu fuwuzhan/suo) http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/71653.html, 
Kangding County urgently needed staff recruitment 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/45834.html   
 
2013: health sector http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/144883.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/144740.html, prefecture level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/160510.html, county level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/160515.html,  township level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/160516.html, TV station 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/171692.html, Yading Nature Reserve 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/160512.html, all county’s promotion 
centers http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/160513.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/171697.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/171698.html, farming associations 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/131237.html    
 
2014: health sector http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/207645.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/215411.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/207696.html, prefecture level 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1601 and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/236808.html, county level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/263520.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/236810.html, township  level 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/237168.html, Yading Nature Reserve 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/237170.html, tourism promotion cen-
ter http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/214190.html,  
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/236809.html, public security (police 
forces) http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/221126.html   
 
2015: health sector http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1683 
and http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1830, public road 
maintenance http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1712, prefec-
ture level http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1718, prefecture 
Tibetan school (zangwen xuexiao) 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1693, prefecture hospital 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1756, birth control unit 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1769, prefecture, county 
and township level http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1805, 
additional prefecture level 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1834 
 
Civil service recruitment  
 
Qinghai (Amdo Qinghai and Yushu TAP): 
 
2007: general intake http://edu.dbw.cn/ad/2007dfgwy/qh07gk.htm, taxation 
office (guojia shuiwuju) 
http://edu.newdu.com/Official/Class942/Class948/200702/6540.html, pub-
lic security agency special police forces (gong’an jiguan gong’an tejing) 
http://gwy.haedu.cn/ofc_xibei/633326347374861743.html   
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2008: general intake http://www.offcn.com/qhgwy/2008/0705/47.html 
 
2009: general intake http://www.qhrs.gov.cn/images/2009062411465707.xls 
(no longer available, but available at 
http://www.qc99.com/gwy/zk/200906/173081.html),  public security agen-
cy – special police forces and grassroots police station officers (gong’an jiguan 
tejing he jiceng paichusuo minjing) 
http://www.qhrs.gov.cn/images/2009072709093823.doc (no longer availa-
ble, but available on 
http://www.chinatat.com/new/1_7_/2009_7_27_ga36524052171727900223
250.shtml), public security agency – special police forces and grassroots police 
station officers (gong’an jiguan tejing he jiceng paichusuo minjing)  
http://www.hdrs.gov.cn/images/2009033016370145.xls  (compare 
http://www.gaoxiaojob.com/zhaopin/gongwuyuankaoshi/news/20090331/
17758.html)  
 
2010: general intake http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/10510.html 
 
2011: general intake 
http://www.offcn.com/dl/2013/0723/20130723052203349.xls, public secu-
rity agency – special police forces (gong’an jiguan tejing) 
http://gongwuyuan.eol.cn/gazj/201108/t20110824_672988.shtml, taxation 
office (guojia shuiwuju) http://www.233.com/NewsFiles/2010-
10/13/liyan/qinghai.xls  
 
2012: general intake 
http://www.qhhrss.gov.cn/images/2012031909042238.xls, public security 
agency – people’s police (gong’an jiguan renmin jingcha) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content219.html, taxation office (guojia 
shuiwuju) http://www.233.com/gwy/zhiwei/20111014/114154662.html 
 
2013: general intake http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/content400.html, addi-
tional intake of specialized political-legal positions (xinzeng zhengfa xiang-
bian) http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content631.html, additional intake for 
administrative positions in Tibetan regions (zangqu xinzeng xingzheng bian-
zhi) http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content750.html, taxation office (guojia 
shuiwuju) http://gwy.qnr.cn/jieshao/20121015/67585.html  
 
2014: general intake http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content979.html, police 
officers (gong’an jiguan renmin jingcha) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/17/Content914.html, court and inspection sys-
tem (fayuan, jianchayuan) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content1498.html, taxation office (guojia 
shuiwuju) http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2013-10/17/c_125552645.htm  
 
2015: http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content1679.html , taxation office 
(guojia shuiwuju) http://gwy.examw.com/Dynamic/zkzw/111496/, public 
security agency – people’s police (gong’an jiguan renmin jingcha) 
http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content2092.html, court and inspection sys-
tem (fayuan, jianchayuan)  
http://www.qhpta.com/html/4/Content2228.html,  
 
Gannan TAP: 
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2009: 
http://www.exam8.com/zige/gongwuyuan/guojia/200904/228553.html, le-
gal system and public security (fayuan xitong, gonganju) 
http://www.edu24ol.com/web_news/html/2009-
7/200971691841553_1.html   
 
2010: http://www.lxycjy.gov.cn/info/news/content/43084.htm, 
http://www.chinatat.com/new/201011/su36912633101110102147.shtml , 
legal system (fayuan xitong)  
http://www.rst.gansu.gov.cn/UploadFiles/201071222239347.xls  
 
2011: 
http://www.rst.gansu.gov.cn/Public/Uploads/month_1108/2011081708403
09739.xls, 
http://www.rst.gansu.gov.cn/Public/Uploads/month_1108/2011081706340
56859.xls, legal and inspection system (zhengfa jiguan fayuan / jianchayuan 
xitong) http://www.offcn.com/zhaokao/zkxx/2011/08/03/40054.html 
 
2012: http://edu.qq.com/a/20120510/000154.htm, legal system (zhengfa 
jiguan fayuan xitong) http://gs.huatu.com/2012/0801/342357_4.html  
 
2013: http://edu.sina.com.cn/official/2013-05-20/1042380797.shtml, inspec-
tion system (zhengfa jiguan jianchayuan xitong) 
http://gs.huatu.com/2013/0823/703808.html  
 
2014: http://edu.sina.com.cn/official/2014-07-18/1154427817_2.shtml 
(links to the offical Gansu government download page at 
http://www.rst.gansu.gov.cn), inspection system (zhengfa jiguan jianchayuan 
xitong) 
http://www.chinagwy.org/html/gdzk/ganshu/201408/86_75324.html , pub-
lic security agency - people’s police officers (gong’an xitong – renmin jingcha) 
http://www.gn.gansu.gov.cn/uploadfile/2014/0807/20140807104457626.xls 
, Gansu province highway police 
http://www.exam8.com/zige/gongwuyuan/zhaojing/201407/2952439.html 
(links to 
http://www.rst.gansu.gov.cn/Public/Uploads/month_1407/2014071802132
08905.xls)  
 
2015: provincial and prefectural levels 
http://www.rst.gansu.gov.cn/show/25148.html 
 
Aba TAP provincial level: 
 
2009: provincial level agencies and management system  
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009329/2009329170207_n_3791.html  
 
2010: land taxation system (dishui xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/20101029/20101029110651_n_6400.html, provincial 
level agencies and management system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010101/2010101215012_n_6265.html, prison labor 
reeducation system (jianyu laojiao xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010101/2010101220114_n_6266.html,  
commerce system http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/82867.html 
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2011: court system (fayuan xitong) and inspection system (jianchayuan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010101/2010101222013_n_6267.html, 
provincial level agencies and management system, land taxation system, 
commerce system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011919/2011919115049_n_7949.html, prison labor 
reeducation system (jianyu laojiao xitong) 
http://edu.offcn.com/2011/0324/7558.html, prison system (jianyu xitong) 
http://www.scsf.gov.cn/tzgg/2241.jhtml?jdfwkey=qifw4  
 
2012: provincial level agencies and management system (document title is 
„provincial level agencies and land taxation system“) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012914/2012914202804_n_9773.html, prison po-
lice staff (jianyu xitong renmin jingcha) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012322/2012322170416_n_8881.html, court system 
cadres and police officers (fayuan xitong zhengfa ganjing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012813/2012813163625_n_9668.html, commerce 
system http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/82867.html, court system 
(fayuan xitong) and inspection system (jianchayuan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011922/2011922205534_n_7974.html 
 
2013: provincial level agencies and land taxation system (shengzhi jiguan he dishui 
xitong) http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013916/2013916161646_n_11414.html, pro-
vincial level agencies and management system (shengzhi jiguan he chiguan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013313/2013313141957_n_10618.html, court sys-
tem (fayuan xitong) and inspection system (jianchayuan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012921/201292195314_n_9797.html, prison securi-
ty staff (jianyu xitong renmin jingcha) 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10464/10720/10722/2013/3/14/10251314.sh
tml  
 
2014: provincial level agencies and taxation system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014823/2014823190015_n_12541.html, prison po-
lice staff http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201442/201442122625_n_12002.html, 
court system and inspection system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013917/2013917164359_n_11438.html  
 
2015: court system (fayuan xitong) and inspection system (jianchayuan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014823/2014823185930_n_12540.html, township 
agencies (recruited from excellent village cadres and workers) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2015325/2015325153139_n_13204.html, prison sys-
tem http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2015327/2015327181429_n_13243.html  
  
Ganzi TAP provincial level: 
 
2009: provincial level agencies and management system  
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009329/2009329170207_n_3791.html, prison labor 
reeducation system (jianyu laojiao xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2009417/2009417184037_n_3953.html  
 
2010: provincial level agencies and management system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010101/2010101215012_n_6265.html, prison labor 
reeducation system (jianyu laojiao xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010101/2010101220114_n_6266.html 
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2011: provincial level agencies and management system, land taxation system, 
commerce system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011919/2011919115049_n_7949.html, prison labor 
reeducation system (jianyu laojiao xitong) 
http://edu.offcn.com/2011/0324/7558.html , court system (fayuan xitong) 
and inspection system (jianchayuan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010101/2010101222013_n_6267.html, prison sys-
tem (jianyu xitong) http://www.scsf.gov.cn/tzgg/2241.jhtml?jdfwkey=qifw4  
 
2012: provincial level agencies and management system (document title is 
„provincial level agencies and land taxation system“) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012914/2012914202804_n_9773.html, commerce 
system http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/82867.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/83078.html and 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/82866.html, prison police staff (jianyu 
xitong renmin jingcha) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012322/2012322170416_n_8881.html, court system 
cadres and police officers (fayuan xitong zhengfa ganjing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012813/2012813163625_n_9668.html, prison ca-
dres and police officers (jianyu zhengfa ganjing)   
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/75979.html, court system (fayuan 
xitong) and inspection system (jianchayuan 
xitong)http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011922/2011922205534_n_7974.html  
 
2013: provincial level agencies and management system (shengzhi jiguan he chi-
guan xitong) http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013313/2013313141957_n_10618.html, 
provincial level agencies and land taxation system (shengzhi jiguan he dishui 
xitong) http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013916/2013916161646_n_11414.html, 
prison security staff 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10464/10720/10722/2013/3/14/10251314.sh
tml (also http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/119143.html), inspection sys-
tem (jianchayuan xitong) http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/85683.html, 
court system (fayuan xitong) http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/85661.html 
 
2014: provincial level agencies and taxation system 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014823/2014823190015_n_12541.html, prison po-
lice staff http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201442/201442122625_n_12002.html, 
court system http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/157863.html, inspection 
system http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/157885.html   
 
2015: court system (fayuan xitong) and inspection system (jianchayuan xitong) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014823/2014823185930_n_12540.html, township 
agencies (recruited from excellent village cadres and workers) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2015325/2015325153139_n_13204.html, prison sys-
tem http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2015327/2015327181429_n_13243.html, pro-
vincial level agencies 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2015327/2015327183121_n_13244.html   
 
Aba TAP: 
 
2007: general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2007828/2007828102639_n_1972.html  (longer 
available, but available at http://www.docin.com/p-10577372.html)  
 80 
 
(2008 special police: http://www.docin.com/p-775391498.html and 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2008918/2008918112318_n_3169.html ) 
 
2009: general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/20091110/20091110210047_n_4816.html  
special police forces (gong’an tejing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/200976/200976111654_n_4330.html  
 
2010: general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010930/2010930220951_n_6260.html  
 
2011: general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011916/2011916212549_n_7941.html, special po-
lice forces (gong’an tejing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011922/2011922225744_n_7975.html  
 
2012: first general intake http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/750.jhtml, second 
general intake 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggfw1/msfw/jyfw/jyaz/gwyzk/bgxz/201211/
P020121102401298483936.xls (compare 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggfw1/msfw/jyfw/jyaz/gwyzk/fwzn_17305/2
01211/t20121102_860001.html)  
 
2013: http://download.scpta.gov.cn/zlxz/2013absbngwyzwbfj1.xls 
(compare 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggfw1/msfw/jyfw/jyaz/gwyzk/fwzn_17305/2
01303/t20130315_896274.html)  
 
2014: first general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201441/201441204753_n_11996.html, second gen-
eral intake http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014823/2014823184008_n_12520.html, 
special police forces (gong’an tejing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201442/201442135253_n_12010.html  
 
2015: people’s police 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/20151014/20151014122706_n_13878.html, prefec-
ture level agencies 
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/ggl/gzgx/201506/t20150623_1074323.html 
 
Ganzi TAP: 
 
2007: village and township finance and law enforcement systems 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2007827/2007827105459_n_1962.html (document 
no longer available, but available at http://www.doc88.com/p-
1804676247953.html) 
 
2009: village, township and county levels 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/zwgk/gwyzk/zkdt/200903/t20090323_644584.shtml, 
special police forces (gong’an tejing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/200976/200976105922_n_4329.html  
 
2010: general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2010930/2010930201704_n_6244.html  
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2011: second general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011916/2011916191727_n_7932.html, special po-
lice forces (gong’an tejing) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2011922/2011922200622_n_7970.html  
 
2012:  
First intake: general intake http://sc.offcn.com/html/2012/04/12008.html  
Second intakes: general intake 
http://u1.huatu.com/sichuan/wenjian/2014040109.xls, village and township 
agencies (xiangzhen jiguan) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2012914/2012914203431_n_9778.html  (compare 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/82998.html) 
 
2013:  
First intake: general intake 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013312/2013312212811_n_10607.html  
Second intakes: prefecture level, county level, united front (tongzhan xitong), re-
ligious affairs and related such as temples management (zongjiao xitong, simiao 
guanli fuwusuo) 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2013918/2013918161721_n_11449.html  
 
2014:  
First intake: http://file.scpta.gov.cn/201442/201442121613_n_12001.html  
Second intake: 
http://file.scpta.gov.cn/2014823/2014823184747_n_12527.html  
Police officers (renmin jingcha) 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1463 (compare 
http://www.sdsgwy.com/article/html/221126.html) 
 
2015: 
People’s police http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1829  
Prefecture-level agencies 
http://www.gzrsks.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=1849  
 
TAR: 
 
2007: http://www.xizang.gov.cn/xxs/56016.jhtml  
 
2008: http://www.gjgwy.org/html/ArticleShow/2008426/4291.htm (docu-
ment no longer available, but available at 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=kEUTTcNGWCB9_MUjaFIyVV0i9gCvb
yFrPRchARW_OIBpFgySRluaBXn0-XVqQZ1KS-
WcQYkZ6Q9We071tyBaNVGOg03RveqQbDs3-qw9WxC), 
http://www.chinatat.com/new/1_7_/2008_12_29_ga2709311111922180027
020.shtml  
 
2009: http://www.cicp.edu.cn/200506/article/2009-04/2072.htm， 
http://gongwuyuan.eol.cn/di_fang_2713/20090710/t20090710_390352_2.sh
tml  
 
2010: http://www.offcn.com/xzgwy/2010/0413/16.html, 
http://www.offcn.com/xzgwy/2010/0830/26.html    
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2011: http://edu.sina.com.cn/official/2011-04-02/1653290961.shtml,  
http://www.chinagwy.org/html/xwsz/zyxw/201109/21_32061.html  
 
2012: http://www.utibet.edu.cn/news/article_38_58_485.html， 
http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/2012819/n6008989.html  
 
2013: http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/2013318/n28911121.html, 
http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/201393/n88261216.html  
 
2014: http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/2014627/n12361360.html, 
http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/2014812/n21021396.html  
 
2015: http://www.xz.hrss.gov.cn/news/201554/n71111557.html  
 
 
 
